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ABSTRACT
This dissertation intends to address the following two issues: 1) Persistence of the bias in
analysts' earnings forecasts; 2) Investors’ response to such bias. It extends the understanding of
information economics in earnings studies, and is expected to improve asset pricing models,
suggest better model specifications for earnings studies, provide regulatory policy implications,
and facilitate discussions on investor rationality.
Using two look-back portfolio formation methods that capture salient features of analysts'
past forecasting behavior, I form quintile portfolios that describe the range of analysts' forecasting
behavior. The optimistic portfolios refer to the portfolios containing firm-quarters whose
contemporaneous forecast errors are likely to be negative, while the pessimistic portfolios refer to
the portfolios containing firm-quarters whose contemporaneous forecast errors are likely to be
positive. Evidence that the two formation methods have significant predictive power for the
contemporaneous forecast errors is found and this suggests that there is persistent bias in analysts’
earnings forecasts.
Investors’ response to the persistent bias is characterized by two hypotheses. The naïve
expectations hypothesis (NEH) predicts that investors naively follow analysts’ past forecasting
behavior, while the rational expectations hypothesis (REH) predicts that investors fully adjust for
analysts’ past forecasting behavior when investors form their own expectations about
contemporaneous earnings.
Major findings are reported regarding behaviors of two market participants − financial
analysts and investors − in forming their expectations in quarterly earnings. The first set of
findings provides strong evidence of persistent bias in analysts' forecasts. The second set of
findings suggests that investors’ reaction to analysts’ forecasting behavior is complex. The data
does not strongly reject the NEH in favor of the REH. It is speculated that investors sometimes
seem neither naïve nor rational. Rather, they seem to possess another type of quasi-rational
behavior other than naïve. As a result, the simple framework (NEH versus REH) used in this
dissertation has a limit. The examination of a full range of investor behavior is encouraged for
future research.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Overview

Behavioral finance is no longer as controversial a subject as it once was.
As financial economists become accustomed to thinking about the role of
human behavior in driving stock prices, people will look back at the
articles published in the past 15 years and wonder what the fuss was about.
I predict that in the not-too-distant future, the term "behavioral finance"
will be correctly viewed as a redundant phrase. What other kind of finance
is there? In their enlightenment, economists will routinely incorporate as
much "behavior" into their models as they observe in the real world. After
all, to do otherwise would be irrational [Thaler (1999; p. 16)].
In the real world, two groups of market participants − rational and quasi-rational −
coexist.1 If the quasi-rational participants dominate the rational ones in the market
decision-making process, rational market equilibrium is unlikely to be achieved. For
example, if analysts behave quasi-rationally due to certain economic incentives or noneconomic behavior when they forecast earnings, then their earnings forecasts are likely to
show systematic patterns − overreaction, underreaction, optimism, or pessimism − as
reported in a wealth of finance and accounting literature.
Currently, there are two basic alternative explanations for analysts' earnings
forecasting behavior − one based on response to economic incentives and the other based
on non-economic behavior. Some argue that economic incentives may influence
1

Thaler (1986) defines quasi-rational behavior as behavior that is "purposeful, regular, and yet
systematically different from the axioms of economic theory" (p. S280). Thus, he argues that "someone

1

analysts' earnings forecasts because of analysts' underwriting relationships with
companies whose earnings they are forecasting, career (reputation) concerns, or earnings
management by companies being analyzed [Scharfstein and Stein (1990); Dechow,
Hutton, and Sloan (1998); Michaely and Womack (1999); Degeorge, Patel, and
Zeckhauser (1999); Lim (2000)].
The second group of explanations draws from behavioral scientists and financial
economists to suggest that individuals do not tend to follow the statistical theory of
prediction.2 Rather, individuals use their own subjective probability of an event (e.g.,
unexpected earnings information) to determine their response to the event [Kahneman
and Tversky (1972, 1973); Tversky and Kahneman (1973); Einhorn and Hogarth
(1985)].3 A wealth of behavioral finance literature has reported that there exist behavioral
tendencies in both analysts' and investors' reactions to unexpected earnings information.
In the context of reactions to earnings information, such behavioral tendencies of analysts
and/or investors have been characterized as overreaction, underreaction, or optimism [De
who systematically overreacts to new information in violation of Bayes' rule is predictable yet only quasirational" (p. S281). In this paper, the market participants of interest are financial analysts and investors.
2
The statistical theory of prediction refers to the normative (Bayesian) approach in which probability can
be operationally defined via choices among events. If two events provide identical payoffs but one is
preferred to the other, it follows that the probability of winning is greater for the chosen alternative.
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1973), the statistical theory of prediction involves three types of
information: prior information, specific evidence concerning the individual case, and the expected accuracy
of prediction.
3
As in Kahneman and Tversky (1972; p. 431), as opposed to the Bayesian probability (or objective
probability) of an event, "subjective probability of an event" is defined as any estimate of the probability of
an event that is provided by a subject, or represented by his or her behavior. Unlike the statistical theory of
prediction (the Bayesian probability), the subjective probability relies not on prior probability but on a
judgmental heuristic called representativeness [Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1973)]. This approach
predicts that a person, in many cases, judges that an event is more probable than another whenever the
former appears to represent both the population proportion and the randomness of the process. For
example, when a group of subjects are given the sequence of coin tosses, more subjects document that
HTTHTH is more probable than either HHHHTH or HHHTTT, although all three sequences have the same
prior probabilities [Tversky and Kahneman (1973); also see Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) for a similar
example].
2

Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987, 1990); Bernard and Thomas (1990); Abarbanell (1991);
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992); Easterwood and Nutt (1999)].
Few studies, however, investigate the relationship between behavioral tendencies
in analysts' earnings forecasts and investors' reactions to such tendencies [Abarbanell and
Bernard (1992); Dechow and Sloan (1997); Ackert and Athanassakos (1997)]. This
research issue is important because it may enhance our understanding of the persistent
post-announcement date stock return anomalies, the validity of model specifications in
previous earnings studies, regulatory incentives in securities markets, and investors'
rationality in response to analysts' forecasting behavior. In addition, the empirical
findings of the current research may improve various asset pricing models, just as other
behavioral finance literature has.4
A large body of literature documents that analysts' forecasts provide the best
proxy for investors' earnings expectations, and tend to outperform the time-series models
[Brown and Rozeff (1978); Fried and Givoly (1982); Givoly and Lakonishok (1984);
Conroy and Harris (1987); Brown et al. (1987); O'Brien (1988); Kross, Ro, Schroeder
(1990)]. The recent studies about systematic behavioral tendencies in analysts' forecasts
and investors' expectations utilize analysts’ forecast errors based on analysts' forecasts
compiled from a variety of sources [Abarbanell and Bernard (1992); Ali, Klein, and
Rosenfeld (1992); Elliott, Philbrick, and Wiedman (1995); La Porta (1996); Ackert and
Athanassakos (1997); Clement (1999); Easterwood and Nutt (1999)]. In line with these

4

Traditional asset pricing models (e.g., CAPM and APT) assume market efficiency. These models imply
that abnormal returns cannot exist in equilibrium taking necessary factors (e.g., market portfolio returns,
interest rates, size effect, and so forth) into consideration. They do not consider investors' quasi-rational
behavior as a necessary factor.
3

studies, the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) quarterly consensus earnings
forecasts are used for this dissertation.
There is a wealth of literature studying stock price reaction to analysts' forecasts
errors or revisions [Givoly and Lakonishok (1979a, 1979b); Hughes and Ricks (1987);
Cornell and Landsman (1989); Teets (1992); Alexander, Jr. (1992); Abarbanell and
Bernard (1992)]. These studies explicitly or implicitly assume that investors' reaction to
earnings information is a function of analysts' forecasts, as if investors’ earnings
expectations equal analysts’ forecasts. A common functional form that shows this
relationship is:
CARit = f ( FEit )

(1-1)

where
CARit

= the cumulative abnormal return for the event period around the
earnings announcement t for firm i (e.g., 1-year holding period, from
–2 to 0 relative to the announcement date, or 1-month abnormal return
in the month including the announcement date, and so forth.);5

FEit

= analysts’ earnings forecast errors at the earnings announcement t for
firm i (= Ait − Fit );

Ait

= actual earnings at the earnings announcement t for firm i; and

Fit

= analysts' consensus forecasts for Ait .

5

In this research, CARit indicates the market-model adjusted 3-day [-2:0] cumulative abnormal returns at
the quarterly earnings announcement t for firm i.
4

Analysts and investors are different types of market participants and may possess
different information sets as well as different behavioral characteristics.6 Analysts'
forecasts, then, may not be an appropriate proxy for investors' expectations. For example,
suppose analysts' forecasts are biased, but investors can estimate the bias and adjust
accordingly. If so, the previous studies about information content of contemporaneous
unexpected earnings (i.e., forecast errors) may have provided spurious results.
Because analysts’ forecasts may not be the same as investors’ earnings
expectations, the conclusions of prior research using functional forms similar to Equation
(1-1) may involve invalid inferences about the relationship between unexpected earnings
information and investors' reaction to it. In short, the empirical framework for displaying
the relationship between stock price movement and unexpected earnings information may
have been misspecified in prior studies.
To illustrate, first suppose that analysts' forecasts are, indeed, the best proxy for
investors' expectations about future earnings. Then, investors' expectations can be
expressed as follows:
Investors' Expectations ( Et ) = Analysts' Forecasts ( Ft ) = f (θ t , B analyst )

(1-2)

where

θt

= information sets of analysts at the quarterly earnings announcement t;

Banalyst = analysts' behavioral tendencies at t; and
Ft

= analysts' earnings forecasts at t.

For convenience, firm subscripts are dropped hereafter.
6

Recall that I use the term "behavior" to indicate non-economic behavior based on the subjective
5

I refer to the assumption that investors' expectations equal analysts' forecasts as
the naïve expectations hypothesis (NEH). The conclusions of previous studies that use
analysts’ forecasts as the proxy for investors' expectations should then be qualified by the
NEH. The NEH predicts that investors naively follow analysts' forecasts when they form
their expectations about contemporaneous earnings. Note that naïve reaction is a type of
quasi-rational behavior.
There is, however, growing evidence that analysts' forecasts may exhibit
systematic patterns, which may be used to classify analysts' behavior (e.g., optimistic,
pessimistic, or rational). If investors incorporate their knowledge of such systematic
patterns in analysts’ forecasts rather than naively accepting the forecasts at face value,
then the NEH is invalid.
My research postulates that the NEH is a questionable approach because investors
may adjust for analysts’ forecasting behavior, and/or display behavioral tendencies
themselves. For example, suppose analysts issue biased forecasts, and investors know the
direction of the bias. That is, investors' expectations are conditioned on investors'
information sets and the behavioral tendencies of both investors and analysts:7
Investors' Expectations = f (φ t , B Investor )

(1-3)

where

φt

= information sets of investors, which include knowledge of systematic

probability of a subject.
7
Although the two information sets intersect, they are assumed to be different because the financial
analysts are likely to have information advantages over investors due to analysts' superior expertise and
better position for information collection. Investors’ information sets may also include knowledge of
analysts’ behavior. Because of the passage of Regulation FD, the gap between the two may be narrowed.
6

behavioral tendencies of analysts, Banalyst , and their recent earnings
forecasts; and
Binvestor = non-economic behavioral tendencies of investors.8
If analysts' forecasts and investors' expectations are significantly different,
investors' reactions to unexpected earnings information calculated by using analysts'
forecasts (i.e., analysts’ forecast errors; FEs ) may not be viewed as valid indicators of
investors' reactions to their own expectation errors. If investors' earnings expectations are
not equal to analysts' forecasts, analysts' forecast errors are not the real unexpected
earnings information. It is thus necessary to distinguish between investors' expectation
errors and analysts’ forecast errors.
A more general approach proposed herein decomposes investors' reaction to the
earnings announcement based on analysts’ forecasts into two components: self-collected
information that contains analysts’ behavior and forecasts ( φ t ), and investors' own
behavioral tendencies in earnings expectations ( Binvestor ) as shown in Equation (1-3). The
first component can be seen as a combination of analysts’ forecasting behavior and
residual self-collected information. The NEH implies that investors ignore analysts’ past
forecasting behavior.
On the other hand, investors may rationally take analysts’ forecasting behavior
into account and adjust for it when they form their own earnings expectations. In this
case, analysts’ forecasting behavior is a significant determinant of investors’

8

Note again that non-economic behavioral tendencies are defined as a type of quasi-rational behavior
[Thaler (1986)].
7

expectations, and investors’ reaction to earnings surprises (analysts' forecast errors) is
unlikely to reflect systematic underestimation or overestimation. Based on this argument,
an alternative hypothesis to the NEH is defined as the hypothesis that investors rationally
adjust for observed analysts' forecasting behavior, and will be called rational expectations
hypothesis (REH).9
Under the REH the market reaction to the earnings announcement for an
optimistic stock will be significantly different from that for a pessimistic stock.10 The
rational investors fully adjust for analysts' optimism by discounting analysts' optimistic
forecasts or fully account for analysts' pessimism by placing a premium on analysts'
pessimistic forecasts. They will not, as a result, take at face value the unexpected
earnings information (i.e., analysts' forecast errors) at the earnings announcement.
The NEH and the REH are not exhaustive hypotheses of investor behavior. The
NEH demonstrates the most simplistic type of quasi-rational investor behavior (naïve
following of analysts' forecasts), while the REH presumes fully rational investor behavior
(full adjustment of analysts' forecast bias). Alternative hypotheses involve what might be
collectively termed variations of quasi-rationality.11 For example, what if investors
amplify or over-adjust for analysts' optimism or pessimism in earnings forecasts? If this
is the case, analysts' optimism will be reinforced or overly discounted in the investors’
reaction to earnings surprises, while analysts' pessimism will be reinforced or given too
9

Note that while analysts’ earnings forecasts are observable, investors’ earnings expectations are not. In
this research, investors’ earnings expectations can be indirectly inferred by examining the two proposed
hypotheses: NEH and REH.
10
A(n) pessimistic (optimistic) stock indicates a stock that has been characterized by analysts' pessimism
(optimism) in quarterly earnings forecasts.
11
Consistent with Thaler (1986), the quasi-rational behavior here is defined as behavior that is "purposeful,
regular, and yet systematically different from the axioms of economic theory (p. S280).
8

much premium. That is, investors are neither naïve nor fully rational. Alternative
hypotheses vary with investors’ behavioral tendencies (other than naïve) in earnings
expectations, they might be termed the behavioral expectations hypothesis (BEH)
collectively. Although the BEH is an important aspect of research, I will suppress its
discussion for the purpose of parsimony.12

1.2

Motivations

1.2.1 Need for New Perspective: A Valid Specification

As noted in the previous section, few studies have evaluated investors' reaction to
analysts' forecasting behavior. Most existing studies have largely ignored the "behavior"
element of analysts' forecasts as a determinant of investors’ expectations in future
earnings, implicitly assuming that investors take analysts' forecasts at face value. The
literature has by-and-large implicitly assumed that investors' reaction to earnings
information is characterized by the NEH. However, my approach incorporates analysts'
forecasting behavior into the model in which investors' reaction to earnings
announcements is examined.
If investors' expectations significantly differ from analysts' forecasts, this
functional form is misspecified, since investors' reaction is based on additional

12

If I discuss the BEH along with the NEH and the REH, I may end up producing many speculations about
investors' reaction to analysts' forecasting behavior as opposed to showing economically meaningful
empirical findings. I will briefly discuss the BEH in Chapter 7 and give some speculation about the market
reaction to analysts' forecasting behavior under the BEH.
9

information about analysts' forecasting behavior which is known to them, and which may
cause investors to view analysts' forecasts as biased. Thus, Equation (1-1) should
incorporate investors' expectations ( E t ) into the function instead of analysts' forecasts
( Ft ). The functional form I propose is:

CARt = g (TEt )

(1-4)

where
TE t = investors' expectation errors = At − Et ; and
other terms are as defined before.
It is now obvious that the traditional functional form, CARt = f ( FEt ) , should be
modified if investors' expectations are believed to be different from analysts' forecasts. If
analysts' forecasts ( Ft ) are not, in fact, unbiased estimates of investors' expectations ( Et ),
then the parameter estimate of analysts' forecast errors ( FEt ) is a biased measure of the
market sensitivity to investors' expectation errors to the extent of the systematic
difference between Et and Ft .
Research for the relation between analysts' forecasting behavior and investors'
expectations in future earnings remains largely an uncharted area. Such research enables
a more thorough investigation on the relevance of earnings information flows from firms
to analysts to investors.
The empirical findings would have important implications for investments and
regulatory policies. For instance, in this case the naïve investors take analysts' forecasts
as unbiased the naïve investors' forecast errors are equal to analysts' forecast errors. By

10

definition, these investors will experience misperceived earnings surprise with the result
that the stocks will be mispriced during the announcement period. However, notice that
this does not take into account a multi-period view. One interesting research question
would be whether and how the mispricing corrects itself, and if so, when it happens.
If it can be shown that the underpricing is systematically associated with analysts’
forecasting behavior, regulators may have incentives to ensure that investors have the
information necessary to better assess analysts' earnings forecasts. The Securities and
Exchange Commission's Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) became effective on October
23, 2000, and may be a consequence of such incentives.13

1.2.2

Defining Optimism and Pessimism as Behaviors

A shortcoming of the extant studies about analysts' forecasts and investors'
reaction to the earnings announcement is that, taken collectively, they do not provide
readers with clear definitions of such concepts as overreaction, underreaction, optimism,
or pessimism.14 Some studies define overreaction as overweight on current unexpected

13

"Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) is a new issuer disclosure rule that addresses selective disclosure. The
regulation provides that when an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, discloses material nonpublic
information to certain enumerated persons (in general, securities market professionals and holders of the
issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis of the information), it must make public disclosure of
that information" [Federal Register: August 24, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 165, pp. 51715-51740)]. The
Regulation FD was passed on August 10, 2000, appears in Federal Register, and took effect on October 23,
2000.
14
Unless qualified, overreaction, underreaction, optimism, and pessimism indicate both analysts' and
investors’ perspectives. For example, optimism implies either analysts' or investors' optimism, while
analysts' optimism means only optimistic behavioral tendencies in analysts' forecasts.
11

earnings information (i.e., analysts' forecast errors) resulting in either overvaluation or
undervaluation, and underreaction as underweight on current unexpected earnings
information (resulting in either undervaluation or overvaluation).15 There is, however, no
universal agreement among existing studies on how the terms describing behavioral
phenomena are defined.
Although optimism and pessimism are the concepts that are closely associated
with both underreaction and overreaction, the former have attracted less attention than the
latter, and have not been discussed in depth until recently. La Porta (1996) implies that
analysts' optimism is equal to the difference between the actual values of earnings and
analysts' forecasts where analysts' forecasts are greater than the actual earnings. Thus, he
argues that if analysts' forecast errors, At − Ft , are consistently negative it means analysts
are, on average, optimistic. Because most existing studies either explicitly or implicitly
assume that analysts' forecasts are an appropriate proxy for investors' expectations (i.e.,
they assume the NEH), the same notions of optimism in analysts' forecasts have been
applied to investors' expectations.
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) provide a different definition of analysts' optimism,
arguing that in an optimistic framework analysts tend to underreact to negative
information and overreact to positive information.16 As shown in their paper, analysts’
optimism is not mutually exclusive of either overreaction or underreaction, but
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That is, overweighting positive earnings news results in overvaluation while overweighting negative
earnings news leads to undervaluation. Most of existing studies haven't explicitly taken the types of news
(i.e., good or bad) into consideration.
16
From the optimism definition, I can induce the definition of pessimism: overreaction to bad news and
underreaction to good news. These definitions of optimism and pessimism are inconsistent with the existing
definitions of optimism and pessimism in overreaction and underreaction studies.
12

interdependent. Analysts’ overreaction to bad news is actually a pessimistic reaction, as is
underreaction to good news. On the other hand, analysts’ underreaction to bad news
indicates an optimistic behavior, as does overreaction to good news. Certain patterns of
over- and underreaction lead to optimism, and other patterns, to pessimism, but clearly
the simple over- and underreaction dichotomy is not equivalent to the optimism and
pessimism dichotomy. It should, however, be noted that the operational definitions of
analysts' optimism and pessimism, whatever the underlying cause, are still negative
forecast errors and positive forecast errors, respectively.

1.3

Concluding Remarks

Investors have access to information about prior forecast errors. Therefore, one
way of discovering analysts' behavior is to analyze historical data.17 This is why
"persistence", if it exists, is an important empirical trait. If analysts' optimism or
pessimism is, indeed, persistent, then another important question arises: How is analysts'
optimism or pessimism incorporated into investors' expectations about future earnings?
Testing the NEH against the REH will provide an empirical answer to this question.
I use portfolios of stocks to test the proposed hypotheses, and these portfolios are
formed on the basis of the historical record of analysts' forecasting behavior prior to the
earnings announcement. To capture analysts' forecasting behavior, the quarterly
consensus earnings forecasts and actual earnings compiled from I/B/E/S are used. It
17

Other methods are conceivable, but impractical (e.g., give each analyst a battery of psychological tests
just prior to every forecast).
13

should be noted that tests of the NEH versus the REH using the formed portfolios are
based on the following presumptions:
(a)

Historical data can be used to determine the range of analysts' forecasting
behavior.

(b)

Analysts' forecasting behavior is a significant determinant of investors'
earnings expectations.18

(c)

Investors' behaviors are dichotomized into naïve and rational.

In summary, this research intends to answer the following two questions: 1)
Whether the bias in analysts' earnings forecasts is persistent and therefore knowable; 2) If
it is indeed, how investors respond to such bias. The empirical findings would improve
asset pricing models, suggest better model specifications in related studies, provide
regulatory policy implications, and facilitate discussions on investor rationality.
The dissertation is presented in the following order. In the next chapter, the
existing literature is reviewed. Chapter 3 sets forth the hypotheses to be tested and
addresses the empirical models to test the hypotheses. In Chapter 4, two portfolio
formation methods that measure analysts' forecasting behavior are introduced, and 5
portfolios of observations (firm-quarters) revealing the range of such behavior are
formed. Chapter 5 introduces the sample and describes the abnormal return measures.
Chapter 6 presents and discusses the empirical findings, and also suggests their
implications. Chapter 7 summarizes and concludes my dissertation.

18

It is implicitly required to have persistent analysts' forecast errors (or bias) over a certain period of time
so that investors are really exposed to systematic patterns in analysts' forecasts.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

2.1

Overview

Since the De Bondt and Thaler's seminal work (1985), a great deal of research on
inefficiency in analysts forecasts and investors reaction to the earnings announcement has
constituted a literature of earnings studies. The existing literature regarding analysts'
and/or investors' reaction to earnings information can be divided into three categories:
Overreaction and underreaction from investors’ perspectives, overreaction and
underreaction from analysts’ perspectives, and optimism and pessimism from analysts’
perspectives.19 Some studies are supportive of the rational hypothesis that analysts and/or
investors fully utilize all available information and produce unbiased expectations about
future earnings, while the others support the quasi-rational hypothesis that expectations
about future earnings tend to show systematic bias. The latter studies are collectively
called behavioral finance. In the following sections major studies in behavioral finance
are contrasted with rationality-based literature.

19

Recall that most existing studies do not investigate analysts' forecast bias and investors' reaction to the
earnings announcement sequentially or simultaneously, although they seem highly correlated events. In
other words, the existing studies tend to separate investors' earnings reaction behavior from analysts'
forecasting behavior. As a result the former type of studies take into consideration investors' point of view
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2.2

Overreaction and Underreaction: Investors’ Perspectives

Many studies in this category of literature investigate the autocorrelation structure
of analysts' forecast errors, the post-earnings-announcement drift, or the mean reversion
of stock returns following the earnings announcement. To show the autocorrelation
structure in analysts' forecast errors, a handful of studies use distributed-lag models
similar to the following regression model [Bernard and Thomas (1990); Mendenhall
(1991)]:
CARt = γ f + γ 0 FEt + γ 1 FEt −1 + .... + γ k FEt − k + ε t

(2-1)

where

γf

= the intercept term;

γk

= the earnings response coefficient for the forecast error, FEt − k
[k = 0, …, K(=an integer)];

εt

= a random error term assumed independently and identically
distributed; and

other terms are as defined earlier.
Note that by assuming that stock returns are a function of analysts' forecast errors,
studies using this type of model implicitly adopt the NEH. Some studies use lagged
abnormal returns as regressors while others use both lagged forecast errors and abnormal
returns, and the number of lags, k , is usually less than or equal to 4. Positive (negative)

(perspective) on the earnings information, seemingly independent of analysts' point of view (perspective)
on the same information.
16

slope coefficients in a declining pattern in absolute values during a forecasting period
would indicate systematic underreaction (overreaction) of investors to the earnings
announcement.
Another popular technique to investigate investors’ underreaction or overreaction
is to look at the movements of post-announcement abnormal returns relative to preannouncement abnormal returns or pre-announcement performance (i.e., portfolios based
on pre-announcement stock performance, such as winner and loser portfolios) [Bernard
and Thomas (1989); Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996); La Porta (1996)]. To
determine whether abnormal stock returns are permanent or not, post-announcement
abnormal returns are plotted against post-announcement time period (e.g., month, quarter,
or year).20 If the abnormal returns show increasing or decreasing patterns in the same
(opposite) direction as pre-announcement returns, it is taken as evidence of underreaction
(overreaction). Other researchers compare winner and loser portfolios instead of
comparing pre- and post-announcement abnormal returns.

2.2.1 Overreaction

De Bondt and Thaler (1985) conclude that investors tend to place too much
weight on recent earnings information instead of long-term earnings power, and suggest
that corrections of such overreactions explain the long-term reversals of extreme prior
stock price changes. They cite behavioral research to support the overreaction hypothesis

20

The maximum period is usually 5 years.
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under which overreaction to recent information characterizes the securities markets.
Behavioral researchers such as Kahneman and Tversky (1982) argue that individuals are
apt to overreact to unexpected news events, and thus Bayes' rule does not characterize
behavior of individuals.
De Bondt and Thaler (1987) reevaluate the behavioral hypothesis of investor
overreaction found in their 1985 paper by discussing some unresolved issues (e.g., the
effects of size and time-varying risk premia) related to the winner-loser anomaly. They
confirm the winner-loser effect they found in their 1985 paper, and in addition they
suggest that the size effect and difference in risk are not responsible for the winner-loser
effect. They show that risk disparity between the loser and winner portfolios is
insufficient to account for the return gap between the two portfolios. For example, for
annual returns, the CAPM beta for the loser portfolio in up markets is 1.388 and the beta
in down markets is 0.875. On the other hand, the beta for the winner portfolio in up
markets is 0.993 and the beta in down market is 1.198. They argue that it is not
reasonable to say that a portfolio with betas of 1.388 and 0.875 in up and down markets
respectively is riskier than one with betas of 0.993 and 1.198 in up and down markets.21
Thus, the risk effect is rejected. Furthermore, De Bondt and Thaler find that the small
firm effect is not observed in their data.
Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (CLR; 1992) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and
Vishny (LSV; 1994) provide additional evidence of the overreaction effect even after
controlling for fundamental risks. CLR use an OLS multiple regression model

21

De Bondt and Thaler (1987, p. 568)
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incorporating both size and risk measured as the portfolio rank, and test the overreaction
effect. CLR form 20 portfolios by continuously ranking stocks each year on the basis of
their 5-year buy-and-hold returns. Portfolio 1 consists of stocks with the lowest rankingperiod returns, and Portfolio 20 consists of stocks with the highest ranking-period returns.
They obtain evidence that extreme losers (stocks in Portfolio 1) outperform extreme
winners (stocks in Portfolio 20) by 5 percent per year, even after controlling for size,
prior returns, and betas. This evidence is much stronger for smaller firms than for larger
firms. For example, among small firms the abnormal return spread between extreme
losers and winners increases to 10 percent per year. CLR argue that, considering that
individuals are predominant shareholders of small firms while institutional investors
predominantly hold large firms, this is a reasonable result.
LSV also provide evidence that contrarian strategies yield significant abnormal
returns by exploiting the suboptimal behavior of the typical investors. Like many others,
LSV form value and glamour portfolios. But, unlike the others, they use four different
measures: B/M (book-to-market), C/P (cash flow to market value of equity), E/P
(earnings-to-price), and GS (growth rate of sales). LSV contend that value stocks are no
riskier than glamour stocks.22
La Porta (1996) examines systematic errors in analysts’ forecasts, extrapolation,
and contrarian strategies, and reports that analysts' forecasts about earnings growth are
too extreme and contrarian strategies do earn abnormal returns. Consistent with his
22

Note that there are also studies against investors' overreaction. For example, Chen and Sauer (1997)
reexamine the overreaction hypothesis by testing the contrarian investment strategy and find that the
existence of overreaction depends on the sample periods studied. They argue that the contrarian strategy
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expectation, the average raw returns of low-growth firms are 20.9 percentage higher than
those of high-growth firms. He argues that these results are robust even after controlling
for both size and book-to-market ratios, and that a particular time period does not seem to
drive the superior performance of low-growth firms. Notice that La Porta implicitly
assumes investors' naïve reaction to extreme analysts' forecast about earnings growth.23
Rozeff and Zaman (1998) provide another evidence on investor overreaction.
They create deciles of stocks based on a ratio of cash flow to market value of equity each
year for each firm, and as a result value stocks (i.e., highest-decile stocks) and growth
stocks (i.e., lowest-decile stocks) are obtained. Then, Rozeff and Zaman examine the
direction of insider trades along the growth/value spectrum, and find that insider buying
increases as stocks increasingly become value stocks, and insiders tend to sell the stocks
that experienced high returns. This implies that growth stocks are overvalued and value
stocks are undervalued by the outside investors. This is consistent with the predictions of
the overreaction hypothesis. Seyhun (1990) also investigates insider trades in response to
the 1987 Market Crash. To see whether investors reveal their overreacting behavior in the
Crash, Seyhun examines the relation between stock returns before and after the Crash,
insider trading activity, and pre-Crash market risk in a multiple regression framework. He
finds similar results to Rozeff and Zaman (1998). That is, insiders' buying jumps right
after the Crash and the stocks bought by insiders experience larger positive returns.

earns abnormal profits only for specific time periods such as pre-war or pre-energy crisis while the winnerloser portfolio relationship becomes ambiguous during post-war period (i.e., 1940-1950s).
23
If it turns out that investors are, in fact, somewhat rational, we may not attribute the observed abnormal
returns from contrarian strategies to extreme analysts' forecasts in earnings growth.
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Testing both the uncertain information hypothesis and the overreaction
hypothesis, while controlling for size effect, changes in market volatility, and event
direction (positive or negative), Ketcher and Jordan (1994) document short-term market
overreaction. They report that positive (negative) events are followed by negative
(positive) abnormal returns. Zarowin (1989) also identifies the short-run overreaction
effect by examining winner and loser portfolios. Zarowin finds that losers outperform
winners in the subsequent month following extreme performance month.
Controlling for risk changes in addition to other influential components such as
bid-ask spreads, infrequent trading, and firm size, Dissanaike (1997) reexamines the
overreaction hypothesis. He finds supporting evidence for the overreaction hypothesis
that contrarian portfolios (winners – losers), in general, earn negative abnormal returns
during the periods: 12, 18, 24, 30, 36, 42, and 48 months.24
Observing the index futures market in the US and Hong Kong, Fung, Mok, and
Lam (2000) investigate whether intraday price reversals occur in this market. Rejecting
the effects of bid-ask spread and investor panic at market opening, they show that futures
price reversals following large changes in futures price do occur in both the S&P 500
futures and the Hang Seng Index Futures (HSIF) in Hong Kong. Taking contrarian
trading strategies considering transaction costs and execution time lag, Fung et al. show
that the contrarian strategies are associated with positive abnormal returns with a
maximum annual return of 26 percent for the HSIF.

24

Dissanaike (1997, p. 44-45) also finds some evidence of underreaction when shorter rank periods (24 or
36 months) are used.
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2.2.2 Underreaction

In sharp contrast to the overreaction studies, Abarbanell (1991), Abarbanell and
Bernard (1992), Elliot, Philbrick, and Wiedman (1995), Lys and Sohn (1990), and
Mendenhall (1991) report that investors underreact (underweight) to new information
such as interim earnings announcements or changes in stock prices.
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) confirm the underreaction hypothesis that
investors underreact to earnings announcements and the subsequent completion of the
reaction results in a post-earnings-announcement drift. Abarbanell and Bernard show that
investors appear to underreact to the earnings announcement to an even greater degree
than analysts.
Suggesting less noisy measures of the information content of analysts’ forecasts
called updated measures of earnings information content, Stickel (1991) documents that
the market tends to underreact to analysts' forecast revisions. The underreaction results in
price drift in the direction of a revision for about six months after the revisions.
According to Stickel, forecast revisions influence stock prices, but stock prices do not
fully and immediately incorporate the unexpected earnings information. Especially, the
market reaction to forecast revisions is greater for the top or bottom 5 percent of the
distribution of all forecast revisions, and he finds that the spread between the abnormal
returns of confounding revisions (i.e., preceded by earnings, dividend, and stock-split
announcements) and those of non-confounding revisions is not significantly different
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from zero. The abnormal market reaction continues to drift in the direction of the
revisions at least for 6 months.
Bernard and Thomas (1989) investigate two competing explanations for postearnings-announcement drift: delayed price response and risk premium. They examine
various forms of CAPM misspecification – misestimation of beta, exclusion of risk
factors other than systematic market risk, and taxes – as alternative explanations for postearnings-announcement drift, but find no evidence that these factors sufficiently explain
the post-announcement drift. Instead, Bernard and Thomas argue that a delayed response
to earnings information results in the post-announcement drift, and suggest that
transaction costs and failure to full recognize the implications of current earnings for
future earnings are possible reasons for this phenomenon.
Relating the relative magnitudes of market reactions to the autocorrelation
structure of forecast errors, Bernard and Thomas (1990) find a negative relation between
forecast errors at quarter t (or t-4) and abnormal returns around the quarterly earnings
announcement at t+4 (or t), and positive but declining relations between adjacent forecast
errors at quarters t+1, t+2, and t+3 (or t-1, t-2, and t-3) and abnormal returns around the
quarterly announcements for quarter t+4 (or t). The latter relations are consistent with the
underreaction effect, and the former relation indicates overemphasis on the earnings of
the same quarter of the prior year.
Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) investigate both price and earnings
momentum strategies across decile portfolios. The decile portfolios are formed by
ranking stocks on the basis of either prior six-month returns or a measure of earnings
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news.25 They find that both momentum strategies produce economically meaningful price
drift that lasts for at least 6 months. For example, portfolios formed by prior six-month
returns of stocks yield mean return spreads of 8.8 percent over the following six months
while those sorted by a moving average of past consensus forecast revisions create mean
return spreads of 7.7 percent over the subsequent six months.26

2.2.3 Evidence of Rationality

In this section, I contrast the overreaction studies with the underreaction ones. The
main presumption of both types of studies is that investors are not perfectly rational,
rather they are quasi-rational. Recall that "quasi-rational" market participants including
investors are defined as the ones who possess behavioral tendencies in reaction to stock
price information. For instance, "naïve" investors mean the ones who naively take
analysts' earnings forecasts as unbiased even when they can observe that analysts'
forecasts are persistently biased. Thus, the naïve reaction of investors to such bias is a
type of quasi-rational behavior [Thaler (1986)].
There is also, however, a large amount of research that is consistent with the
rational hypothesis − i.e., investors behave on the basis of economic incentives (i.e.,
rational as opposed to quasi-rational). Among others, Chan (1988), Ball and Kothari
25

A stock's past compound return is used as the ranking variable for the price momentum strategy, while
three measures of earnings news [standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), the cumulative abnormal
returns around the earnings announcement, and analysts' forecast revisions] are used as the ranking variable
for the earnings momentum strategy.
26
Comparing price drift of dividend initiation with dividend omission, Michaely, Thaler, and Womack
(1995) document significant price drifts for both initiation and omission announcements over the next three
years.
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(1989), and Akhigbe, Gosnell, and Harikumar (1998) report findings in favor of the
rational hypothesis.
Chan (1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989) contend that variation in risks plays a
main role to induce losers’ outperformance and negative autocorrelation in returns. Chan
finds that the contrarian strategy yields only small abnormal returns for losers after
controlling for risk changes. Ball and Kothari come to a similar conclusion. They suggest
that negative serial correlation is attributed almost entirely to changes in relative risks.
These results are sharply inconsistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Akhigbe,
Gosnell, and Harikumar (1998) test for market efficiency controlling for bid-ask spread,
and report weak winner-loser effect (i.e., a contrarian strategy fails to exploit significant
abnormal returns).

2.2.4 Summary

The findings on the issue of investors' over- and underreaction are mixed. The
point, however, is that few studies make clear how investors perceive and react to
analysts' forecasts about future earnings. For instance, it is barely known whether
analysts' forecast bias is persistent, how investors respond to the persistent bias in
analysts' earnings forecasts, and what factors make investors overreact or underreact to
earnings information. This dissertation provides direct suggestions for the first two
questions and indirect implications for the third.
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2.3

Overreaction and Underreaction: Analysts’ Perspectives

2.3.1 Overreaction

In 1990, De Bondt and Thaler find that analysts systematically overreact to new
earnings information. They estimate a simple linear model that regresses actual changes
in earnings per share (EPS) on forecasted changes in EPS. They observe a negative
constant term and a positive slope coefficient less than one. The negative constant term
indicates that analysts' forecasts are optimistic (i.e., analysts' forecasts in EPS should
exceed the actual EPS to offset the negative constant). The positive slope less than one
suggests that actual earnings change by less than the change in analysts' forecasts. For
example, from their first model a slope coefficient of 0.648 is estimated. This means that
actual earnings change ( AECt ), on average, account for only 64.8 percent of forecasted
earnings forecast ( FECt ). They also contend that the market-to-book value (MV/BV) and
the past growth rate of earnings are significantly associated with analysts' forecast errors.
That is, high MV/BV and high past earnings growth rate are significantly related to
optimism, and low MV/BV and low growth rate leads to pessimism.27
La Porta (1996) tests how analysts revise the expected rates of low-growth and
high-growth stocks from year t to t+1, and documents that the expected rate of low27

Also, there are studies in contrast to the overreaction hypothesis for analysts. For instance, testing a linear
model regressing contemporaneous forecast errors on prior change in actual earnings, Hussain (1996)
provides evidence against the overreaction effect. For the regression model, a negative (positive) slope
coefficient indicates that analysts overreact (underreact) to the previous change in earnings. Except for
large firms, the slope coefficients are not significantly different from zero, and this suggests that there is no
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growth stocks is revised upward from 3.1 percent to 4.1 percent while that of high-growth
stocks fall from 21.7 percent to 18.4 percent. That is, there occurs a mean reversion of
analysts' earnings growth forecasts − an indication of analysts' overreaction to new
earnings information.

2.3.2 Underreaction

Mendenhall (1991) examines the relationship between consecutive earnings
forecast errors to test a hypothesis that consecutive forecast errors of analysts are
positively associated if analysts underweight the current unexpected earnings
information, and supports the hypothesis. Investigating the information content of
analysts' forecast revisions, Lys and Sohn (1990) report analysts' underestimation of new
earnings information between consecutive forecasts. In other words, analysts do not fully
capture new earnings information that becomes available to investors between
consecutive forecasts. Abarbanell (1991) conducts similar research. By employing a
randomization test on signed analysts’ forecast revisions (errors) and signed prior returns,
Abarbanell documents a positive relation between analysts' forecast revisions and prior
returns as do Lys and Sohn (1990).28 This indicates that analysts fail to fully incorporate

evidence of analysts’ overreaction. Even in case of large firms, the overreaction effect is diminished after
removing influential observations.
28
The randomization test rejects the null hypothesis of independence between the signs of analysts’
forecast revisions and the signs of prior returns, and between the signs of analysts’ forecast errors and prior
returns. Note that forecast errors are measured by subtracting actual earnings from analysts’ forecasts
(different from usual calculation). Two return measures are used: raw returns and cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs). Raw returns are the average daily returns for a firm between earnings forecasts while CARs
are cumulative abnormal returns (daily) divided by the number of days between forecasts.
27

prior price changes, and implies that analysts underweight new information. In other
words, analysts do not collect and interpret publicly available signals efficiently.
Using the same autoregressive model of analysts' forecast errors as Mendenhall's
(1991), Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) document the similar results that Mendenhall
reports. Abarbanell and Bernard examine autocorrelations in Value Line analysts'
forecast errors, and report positive and monotonically declining autocorrelations at lags 1,
2, and 3 for firm-specific estimates. But, they find no strong evidence of a significant
negative autocorrelation at lag 4 indicating that analysts’ forecasts do not seem to follow
the seasonal random walk model. Such findings are consistent with the underreaction
hypothesis that analysts underreact (underweight) to recent earnings information.
Applying Hogarth and Einhorn’s (1992) belief-adjustment model to analyst
forecasting framework, Elliot, Philbrick, and Wiedman (1995) examine whether analysts’
revisions are, on average, sufficient to reflect unexpected earnings information, and
document that consensus forecast revisions of analysts tend to underweight unexpected
earnings information. They attribute their findings to analysts’ conservatism in forecast
revisions where individuals make adjustments based Bayesian expectation, but these
adjustments are insufficient in amount.
Testing serial correlation and bias in analysts’ forecast errors, Ali, Klein, and
Rosenfeld (1992) report similar results to Elliot, Philbrick, and Wiedman’s. Regressing
the current forecast error on the past (one-period back) forecast error and the past stock
return, they find significant positive relations between the current forecast error and the
past forecast error, and between the current forecast error and the past stock return. The
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latter results are also found by Beaver et al (1979). This indicates that analysts do not
fully incorporate the last year’s earnings information and stock returns when they form
expectations of future earnings. They extend their research by adding a dummy variable
for the persistence of previous earnings (proxied by E/P ratios) and a dummy variable for
the previous negative earnings, and find that the tendency to omit the earnings
information is greater for firms with permanent earnings than for firms with temporary
(mean-reverting) earnings. Ali, Klein, and Rosenfeld affirm that their findings in annual
forecasting framework are also observed in monthly forecasting framework.

2.3.3 Summary

This category of research focuses on the relation between contemporaneous and
previous analysts' earnings forecast errors, or the relation between actual earnings
changes ( AEC t ) and forecasted earnings changes ( FEC t ) to investigate analysts'
behavioral tendencies in earnings forecasts. AEC t is defined as At − At −1 , and FEC t is
defined as Ft − Ft −1 , where At ( At −1 ) is actual earnings at time t (t-1) and Ft ( Ft −1 ) is
analysts' forecasts for actual earnings at time t (t-1). General models for analysis are as
follows:
FEt = ρ0 + ρ1 FEt −1 + ρ 2 FEt −2 + ... + ρ k FEt − k + et

(2-2)

AECt = δ 0 + δ1 FECt + et′

(2-3)

where all terms are as previously defined.
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In Equation (2-2), k is usually less than or equal to four. If the slope coefficients
in the equation are positive in declining pattern, then the underreaction hypothesis holds.
If they are negative, the overreaction hypothesis holds. For Equation (2-3), the standard
definition of unbiased forecasts would require that δ 0 =0 and δ1 =1 [De Bondt and Thaler
(1990)]. If forecasted earnings changes ( FECs ) are extreme, then δ1 will be less than
one. In addition, the intercept, δ 0 , is an indicator of bias in the forecast. If analysts’
forecasts were upward (downward) biased, δ 0 would be negative (positive).
As in Section 2.2, the studies about analysts' underreaction and overreaction have
documented mixed and controversial findings. This implies that neither underreaction nor
overreaction is a representative behavioral phenomenon in analysts' earnings forecasts.
These results provide evidence that analysts' forecasting behavior may be classified in
spectrum so that I can form portfolios with salient features of their forecasting behavior.
Note that I later use the terms, optimism and pessimism, rather than overreaction and
underreaction because I suspect that the former better capture the range of analysts'
forecasting behavior and overreaction and underreaction are not mutually exclusive
[Easterwood and Nutt (1999)].

2.4

Optimism and Pessimism: Analysts’ Perspectives

Another stream of research on earnings forecasts focuses on optimism and
pessimism in analysts’ forecasts. This category of study has not been investigated in
depth until recently. Many underreaction and overreaction studies incorporate the
30

concepts of optimism and pessimism into underreaction and overreaction discussions
[Abarbanell (1991); Francis and Philbrick (1993); La Porta (1996); Dissanaike (1997)].
In such studies, optimism and pessimism are mechanically defined as negative forecast
errors (i.e., At − Ft < 0 ) and as positive forecast errors, respectively.
Abarbanell (1991) reports that the mean of analysts' forecast errors from 1981 to
1984 is positive (0.04) and the number of overestimated (positive; optimistic) forecast
errors exceeds the number of underestimated ones in each of the four years.29 La Porta
(1996) also reports that the actual earnings tend to be lower than corresponding analysts’
forecasts for almost all portfolios formed on the basis of growth forecasts − i.e., analysts’
forecast errors ( At − Ft ) are negative for most portfolios.
Some studies in this category investigate an association between analysts’
optimism and such factors as forecasting accuracy, uncertainty, and stock
recommendations [Ackert and Athanassakos (1997); Butler and Lang (1991)]. Ackert and
Athanassakos (1997) look at the role of uncertainty in analysts’ optimism and document
that a strong positive relationship between optimism and uncertainty exists. The more
uncertain firms are, the more optimistic analysts are. Butler and Lang (1991) study
individual analysts’ behavior and find that analysts are persistently optimistic or
pessimistic relative to consensus forecasts. They report that analysts’ average optimism
(pessimism) is associated with lower (higher) average forecast accuracy.
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Note that forecast errors here are calculated by subtracting actual earnings from analysts’ forecasts: Fit –
Ait. Abarbanell contends that deflating forecast errors by stock price does not make qualitative differences
in the results he finds. Notice that his forecast error measure is inconsistent with the definition of forecast
errors throughout this dissertation: Ait − Fit.
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Little research has been done on analysts’ pessimism probably because pessimism
is not acknowledged to be underlying feature of analysts' earnings forecasts [Brown
(1996)]. By looking at the percentage of positive, negative, and zero forecast errors per
quarter from 1991 to 1995, Brown (1996) reports evidence that 12 of 18 quarters
considered have higher percentage of positive forecast errors (i.e., actual earnings are
greater than I/B/E/S analysts’ forecasts) than that of negative forecast errors. He interprets
this as a pessimistic tendency of analysts during the period.
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) examine systematic optimism in analysts’ forecasts
by incorporating types of news, and by making an effort to link overreaction and
underreaction concepts to optimism. Simultaneously investigating overreaction and
underreaction in analysts’ forecasts, they reject the overreaction and underreaction
hypotheses and document that analysts underreact to negative information (bad news)
and overreact to positive information (good news). This implies that there exists
systematic optimism in analysts’ forecasts.

2.5

Chapter Summary

Both the overreaction hypothesis and the underreaction hypothesis have
contributed to development of research on behavior of analysts and investors. Although
they seem to argue against each other, they also seem to coexist. Although Michaely,
Thaler, and Womack (1995) provide additional evidence for the underreaction effect,
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they also acknowledge that “the market appears to overreact in some circumstances and
to underreact in others (p. 606)”.30
Although analysts' earnings forecasts and investors' expectations about future
earnings are not mutually independent issues, few studies have tried to integrate them.
Rather, the existing studies investigate such issues as if they are de facto independent.
This study is therefore warranted in order to bridge the gap in existing studies.
The findings in the literature are mixed. The contradictions can be attributed to
different methodologies, samples, periods, measurements, assumptions, specifications,
and so forth. For instance, the results from using Value Line analysts’ forecasts may
differ those from employing I/B/E/S forecasts; assuming that investors naively follow
analysts’ forecasts at face value may be inappropriate; results may be attributed mainly to
additional risk factors such as firm size and/or market-to-book ratio, not to overreaction
or underreaction; it may be that the overreaction effect is a phenomenon for pre-war
periods or for the expansion periods; the error terms of OLS models may not satisfy the
traditional assumptions; necessary explanatory variables are omitted. Taking these
possibilities into consideration is worthwhile, since it surely improves the validity and
reliability of research. Therefore, it is important for a researcher to keep these in mind
when performing an empirical study regarding analysts’ forecasting behavior and
investors' expectations about future earnings.
It should be noted again that most existing literature implicitly assumes investors
naively follow analysts' forecasts − NEH. The NEH is questionable given the fact that
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Also see Fama (1998).
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investors can observe the historical record of analysts' forecasting behavior, since they
might fully adjust for such behavior if they are rational.
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Chapter 3
Hypotheses Development and Empirical Models

3.1

Hypotheses Development

As discussed in the previous chapters, investors’ reaction to analysts' forecasting
behavior has not been a theme.31 In this dissertation, I endeavor to fill a gap by examining
analysts’ forecasting behavior from investors’ perspectives. This is a new approach
because extant studies have not placed much emphasis on the formation of investors’
expectations in response to analysts’ forecasting behavior in earnings forecasts. In the
following discussion, I will develop testable hypotheses − the naïve expectations
hypothesis (NEH) and the rational expectations hypothesis (REH) − along with
qualifications.
As introduced earlier, for previous studies about investors’ reaction to the
earnings announcement a common functional form is:32
CARt = f ( FEt ) = α ′ + β ′FEt + ε t′ ,

(3-1)

where all terms are as defined earlier.

31

Notice that I here use the term “forecasting behavior” instead of “forecast bias.” I use “forecasting
behavior” to emphasize that analysts’ forecast bias is persistent. That is, I implicitly assume that analysts
persistently issue biased forecasts in either optimistic or pessimistic direction. Recall that whether analysts’
forecast bias is persistent is one of the two main research questions to be addressed in my dissertation. I
perform a few persistence tests on analysts’ forecast bias in Chapter 6, since the persistent bias in analysts’
earnings forecasts is a necessary condition for testing the NEH versus the REH.
32
Note again that firm subscripts are suppressed.
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Also, recall that due to the potential persistent bias in analysts' forecasts I develop
a modified functional form incorporating investors' expectations:
CARt = g (TE t ) = α ′′ + β ′′TE t + ε t′′

(3-2)

where all variables are as previously defined.
Recall that most research studying the market reaction to the earnings
announcement assumes that analysts' forecasts are not biased − i.e., takes the NEH for
granted. Equation (3-2), however, suggests that the earnings response coefficient ( β ′ ) in
Equation (3-1) may not measure the real information content of the earnings
announcement (i.e., rational investors' expectation errors) when analysts tend to issue
biased earnings forecasts, and that β ′ may be different from β ′′ . Recall that TEt
represents investors' expectation errors and is equivalent to the difference between actual
earnings and investors' expectations (i.e., At − Et ).33
The NEH predicts that investors take biased analysts' forecasts at face value and
the naïve investors' earnings expectations are equal to analysts' forecasts: Et |NEH = Ft .
Investors' expectation errors are, as a result, the same as analysts' forecast errors:
At − Et |NEH = At − Ft = FEt .
Therefore, under the NEH Equations (3-1) and (3-2) are equivalent. In other
words, investors' reaction to the earnings announcement given analysts' optimistic
behavior is equivalent with that given analysts' pessimistic behavior:
PESS
CARt |OPT
NEH = f ( FEt ) = CARt | NEH = CARt | NEH

33

Et is ex ante investors' earnings expectations. Et can be either rational or naïve investors' earnings
expectations. At is ex post actual earnings.
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where
CARt |OPT
NEH

= the naïve investors' reaction to analysts' optimism in earnings
forecasts manifested in the 3-day [−2:0] CAR; and

CARt | PESS
NEH

= the naïve investors' reaction to analysts' pessimism in earnings
forecasts manifested in the 3-day [−2:0] CAR.34

On the other hand, rational investors, as opposed to naïve investors, would expect
that analysts' forecasts ( Ft ) exceed the actual earnings ( At ) when they believe that
analysts are optimistic. Thus, when rational investors form their own earnings
expectations, they discount analysts' optimistic forecasts and their expectations ( Et |OPT
REH )
are ex ante smaller than analysts' forecasts ( Ft ) or naïve investors’ earnings expectations
35
( Et | NEH ): Et |OPT
It follows that for given actual earnings, rational
REH < Ft = E t | NEH .

investors' expectation errors ( At − Et |OPT
REH ) are algebraically larger than analysts' forecast
errors ( At − Ft ) or naïve investors’ expectation errors ( At − Et | NEH ): At − Et |OPT
REH >
At − Ft = At − Et | NEH [Figure 1-(a)].36 Hence, rational investors' reaction to a given
analysts' forecast error ( CARt |OPT
REH ) is algebraically larger than naïve investors’ reaction
to the same forecast error ( CARt | NEH ) as in Figure 1-(b).
34

In chapter 4, I discuss two portfolio formation methods that describe the range of analysts' forecast bias
(or forecasting behavior) based on the 5-year period prior to the earnings announcements. The portfolios ex
post consist of three optimistic and two pessimistic ones.

35

OPT

Note that EREH indicates rational investors' earnings expectations given analysts' optimism in earnings
PESS

forecasts, while EREH means rational investors' earnings expectations given analysts' pessimism. Also
note that these expectations are unobservable and can be indirectly inferred by testing the proposed
hypotheses.
36
Figure 1 is located in the Appendix.
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The same argument may be applied to the case of analysts' pessimism. The
rational investors, who have classified certain analysts as pessimistic, know that analysts'
forecasts have been underestimated. Given persistence in analysts' forecasting behavior,
investors accordingly expect that the contemporaneous analysts' forecasts display
analysts' pessimism in earnings forecasts (i.e., positive FEs ). It is, then, predicted that
rational investors' earnings expectations in reaction to analysts' pessimism ( Et |PESS
REH ) are
algebraically larger than analysts' forecasts ( Ft ) or naïve investors’ earnings expectations
( Et | NEH ): Et |PESS
REH > Ft = E t | NEH . This results in rational investors' expectation errors
given analyst's pessimism ( At − Et |PESS
REH ) algebraically smaller than analysts' forecast
errors ( At − Ft ) or naïve investors’ expectation errors ( At − Et | NEH ): At − Et |PESS
REH <
At − Ft = At − Et | NEH .
For a given forecast error, provided that At − Et |OPT
REH > At − Ft = At − E t | NEH in
SS
case of analysts' optimism in earnings forecasts and At − Et |PE
REH < At − Ft = At − E t | NEH

in case of analysts' pessimism, At − Et |OPT
REH should be algebraically larger than
At − Et |PESS
REH . In consequence, the market reaction to any given analysts' forecast error
conditional on persistent analysts' optimism should be algebraically larger than that
PESS
conditional on analysts' pessimism: CARt |OPT
REH > CARt | NEH > CARt | REH .

Notice that I do not discuss investors' earnings expectations and reaction to the
earnings announcement conditional on analysts' rational forecasts (i.e., no bias) − ones
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that show neither analysts' optimism nor pessimism.37 Given analysts' unbiased (rational)
RAT
forecasts, both naïve and rational investors' expectations ( Et |RAT
NEH and Et |REH ) about

contemporaneous earnings are predicted to equal analysts’ earnings forecasts:
RAT
Et |RAT
NEH = Et |REH = Ft . Consequently, investigating investors' reaction to analysts' rational

behavior is not useful to test the NEH against the REH because the reaction would be the
same under both the NEH and the REH [Table 1].38 Since the objective of the dissertation
is to investigate how investors respond to persistent bias in analysts’ forecasts, I do not
endeavor to scrutinize investors' reaction to analysts' rational behavior.
In sum, for any given analysts' forecast error At − Ft ( FEt ), the rational market
reaction should be algebraically smaller (larger) in response to analysts' pessimism
(optimism) in earnings forecasts than in response to analysts' optimism. The naïve market
reaction to a given forecast error, otherwise, should be the same whatever analysts'
forecasting behavior is preceded.
The above discussions lead to the following testable null hypothesis − NEH:
NEH: If investors take analysts’ persistent forecast bias at face value, there should be
neither a discount for the optimistic bias nor a premium for the pessimistic bias.
Specifically, investors' reaction to the earnings announcement is equivalent across the
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Note again that in Chapter 4 I ex post form 5 portfolios consisting of the most optimistic to the most
pessimistic portfolios in order.
38
All tables are located in the Appendix.
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range of analysts' forecasting behavior − from optimism to pessimism. This can be
39
PESS
summarized as follows: CARt |OPT
NEH = f ( FEt ) = CARt | NEH = CARt | NEH .

One alternative hypothesis to the NEH is the rational expectations hypothesis
(REH). If investors fully adjust for the analysts' persistent bias in earnings forecasts, there
should be information premiums for the case of analysts' optimism and information
discounts for the case of analysts' pessimism because At − Et |OPT
REH > At − Ft >
At − Et |PESS
REH . In other words, for any given forecast error the rational investors' reaction to
analysts' optimistic behavior is expected to be algebraically larger than their reaction to
PESS 40
analysts' pessimistic behavior: CARt |OPT
REH > CARt | NEH > CARt | REH .

3.2

Empirical Models

The empirical test of the NEH against the REH exhibits the range of investors’
reaction to analysts’ forecasting behavior. As discussed in the following chapter, to
implement the empirical test I classify firm-quarter observations into one of the quintile
portfolios, ranging from the most optimistic [Portfolio 1 (P1)] to the most pessimistic
[Portfolio 5 (P5)]. Investors' reaction to idiosyncratic analysts’ forecasting behavior is,
then, investigated in three versions of multiple regression models:
39

By using the right hand side of Equation (3-1), this equality can be restated as follows:

α OPT + β OPT FEt
β
40

PESS

=

α PESS + β PESS FEt

where

α OPT

and

α PESS

are intercept terms and

are the slope coefficients for the optimism and the pessimism cases respectively.

Similar to footnote 39, this inequality can be expressed as follows: α

α PESS + β PESS FEt

where terms are as defined earlier.
40

OPT

+ β OPT FEt >

β OPT

and

CARt = α1 P1 + α 2 P2 + α 3 P3 + α 4 P4 + α 5 P5 + β1diffSizet + β 2 diffBtoM t + ut
CARt = a1 P1 + a2 P2 + a3 P3 + a4 P4 + a5 P5 + b1

FEt
STDt

+b2 diffSizet + b3 diffBtoM t + υt
CARt = a1′ + a2′ P2 + a3′ P3 + a4′ P4 + a5′ P5 + b1′
+b4′

(3-3)

(3-4)
FEt
FEt
FEt
P2 + b3′
P3
+ b2′
STD
STD
STD

FEt
FEt
P4 + b5′
P5 + b6′ diffSizet + b7′ diffBtoM t + ωt
STDt
STDt

(3-5)

where
CARt

= the 3-day [−2: 0] abnormal stock returns for a quarterly earnings
announcement

Pp

= a dummy variable that equals one if an observation belongs to
portfolio p and zero otherwise, p = 1, …, 5;

FEt

= analysts’ earnings forecast errors at quarter t, FEt = At − Ft ,
where At is the actual quarterly earnings at quarter t and Ft is the
most recent analysts’ consensus forecasts for At ;

STDt

= the standard deviation of analysts' consensus forecasts at quarter t;41

MVEt

= Pt × Shrt where Pt is the closing stock price at the third month of
quarter t and Shrt is the number of common shares used to calculate

41

Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) use stock price ten days prior to forecast date to deflate forecast errors. In
this way, the stock price is unlikely to reflect the information effects of forecasts and earnings
announcements. Instead of following this convention, I use the standard deviation of analysts’ consensus
forecasts as the forecast error deflator to adjust for forecast volatility, which seems to affect CARs [Panels
C and F of Table 3].
41

earnings per share (EPS) at quarter t;
diffSizet

= the difference between log( MVEt ) and the grand mean of
log( MVEt ) where log( MVEt ) is the logarithm of MVEt;

diffBtoM t = the difference between BtoM t and the grand mean of BtoM t
where BtoM t =

BVEt
and BVEt = common equity (total)
MVEt

at quarter t; and
ut , υt , ωt = identically and independently distributed random error terms.
Note that Pt , Shrt , and BVEt are extracted from COMPUSTAT and firm
subscripts are omitted. Also note that I use diffSizet and diffBtoM t instead of the
logarithm of MVEt and BtoM t to adjust for size and book-to-market effects. Notice that
average diffSizet and diffBtoM t are zero. The portfolio dummies and slopes in each
model indicate average fixed and marginal market impacts of the quarterly earnings
announcement for each portfolio given average firm size and book-to-market equal zero.
This transformation allows direct comparison of the fixed and/or marginal market effects
of a portfolio with those of another so that the NEH can be tested against the REH within
each model.
All models perform the market reaction comparisons among portfolios in different
empirical formats. In Equation (3-3), the average forecast error (AFE) for each portfolio
is reflected in the coefficients of Pps that measure average total market effects of
portfolios as if they are fixed, controlling for the size and the book-to-market effects.
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Since the forecast error term is not included as an explanatory variable, the magnitudes of

α 1 ,…, α 5 will reflect different mean forecast errors for respective portfolios.
Equation (3-4) distinguishes the marginal (slope) market effects from the fixed
(intercept) market effects across portfolios, assuming the marginal effects are constant
across portfolios. Equation (3-5) relaxes this assumption by permitting the marginal
effects to vary across portfolios.42
Table 1 summarizes the relationships between analysts’ earnings forecasts and
investors’ earnings expectations and CARs for the optimistic portfolios (e.g., P1) and
CARs for the pessimistic portfolios (e.g., P5) under either the NEH or the REH.43 Under
the NEH, investors’ reaction to their own expectation errors (i.e., TEt ) is the same as that
to analysts' forecast errors (i.e., FE t ) across portfolios, since naïve investors’ earnings
expectations are equal to analysts’ earnings forecasts: CARt |OPT
NEH = f ( FEt ) =
CARt | PESS
NEH = CARt | NEH . Specifically, the coefficients of the portfolio dummy variables in
Equations (3-3), (3-4), and (3-5) as well as the portfolio slopes in Equation (3-5) are
predicted to be statistically the same.
As discussed earlier, the REH proposes that at any given forecast errors CARs for
the optimistic portfolios should be greater than those for the pessimistic portfolios:
PESS
CARt |OPT
REH > CARt | NEH > CARt | REH . Specifically, the coefficients (slope and/or

42

Note that Equations (3-3) and (3-4) do not include the intercept term to make pair-wise comparisons
easy, while Equation (3-5) includes the intercept term using the most optimistic portfolio (P1) as the
reference group. Main results are not affected by the choice of either intercept or no-intercept models.
43
Recall that I do not try to form a rational portfolio because it does not test the NEH versus the REH in my
empirical framework – i.e., for the rational portfolio, if formed, there is no informational distinction
between rational expectation errors under the NEH and those under the REH.
43

intercept) for the optimism case are predicted to be larger than those for the pessimism.
The same argument should hold between the more optimistic and the less optimistic
portfolios and between the less pessimistic and the more pessimistic portfolios.
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Chapter 4
Portfolio Selection

4.1

Overview

Since investors’ perception of the bias in analysts’ consensus forecasts is not
directly observable, I must estimate the direction and degree of bias that investors impute
to a given forecast. I do this by using historical data to create portfolios, which are likely
to differ systematically in terms of perceived bias.
To classify observations (firm-quarters) into the portfolios based on analysts' past
forecasting behavior, I use two portfolio formation methods: Mean-Frequency Forecast
Error (MFFE) and Mean-Frequency Time-Series (MFTS).44 The MFFE method considers
both the mean and frequency of negative analysts' forecast errors (FEs).45 The MFTS
method extends the MFFE by adding time-series characteristics of analysts' earnings
forecasts to the MFFE and utilizes a time-series regression model developed by De Bondt
and Thaler (DBT, 1990). Note that the MFTS can reduce the likelihood of incorrectly
assigning an observation to a portfolio (i.e., Type II error) at the expense of the sample

44

A firm-quarter has information about variables of interest (e.g., analysts' forecasts, actual earnings, the
market value of equity, the book value of equity, etc.) for a firm at the quarterly earnings announcement.
Recall that the term “forecasting behavior” is used instead of “forecast bias" to emphasize analysts’ forecast
bias is persistent.
45
The forecast errors (FEs) are defined as follows: FEt = (At − Ft) where At = actual earnings at
announcement t and Ft = analysts' forecasts for the time t. In the literature, FEs are usually standardized by
the stock price prior to the earnings announcement: SFEt = FEt/Pt-1. where SFEt = standardized forecast
error and Pt-1 = stock price one period (herein, it is 10 days) prior to the quarterly earnings announcement.
45

size.46 Serious Type II error may invalidate the test results from the MFFE, while Type I
error (i.e., the error of falsely excluding an observation from a portfolio when the
observation in fact belongs to the portfolio) does not.
Both methods use 5 years of analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts and actual
earnings prior to the contemporaneous earnings announcement to get necessary statistics:
mean and frequency of negative FEs, and the parameter estimates of the DBT model. The
first two are used to form quintile portfolios for the MFFE, while all three statistics are
employed for the MFTS method. Each portfolio is supposed to represent a different
degree of analysts’ optimism or pessimism in earnings forecasts.
It should be noted that the portfolio formation methods are built on the premise
that analysts’ forecasting behavior is persistent and thus historical performance allows
meaningful inferences about current analysts’ behavior. Given that the test of the NEH
versus the REH is most powerful when comparing extreme portfolios because they more
likely contain observations that reflect real optimism or pessimism of analysts relative to
in-between portfolios, the hypothesis test using the MFTS method and the extreme
portfolios would provide an effective robustness test by alleviating Type II error.
Since the validity of the classification methods is critical for the meaningful
empirical analysis, I carefully develop the portfolio formation methods. Sections 4.1 and
4.2 demonstrate the MFFE and the MFTS methods respectively.
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Due to an additional restriction employed, the sample size for the MFTS is reduced to ¼ level of that for
the MFFE.
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4.2

Mean-Frequency Forecast Error (MFFE) Method

The forecast errors used for the MFFE method are consistent with the definitions
of analysts' optimism and pessimism made in Chapter 1.47 That is, if analysts tend to be
optimistic (e.g., overreact to good news and underreact to bad news) over the past 5
years, then their mean forecasts are, on average, more likely to be algebraically larger
than the mean of actual earnings. It would be also reasonable to predict that the number
of negative forecast errors will exceed the number of positive forecast errors.
Similarly, analysts' pessimism is reflected in higher mean forecast errors and
higher percentage of positive forecast errors. In sum, the higher mean and frequency of
negative forecast errors indicate the higher tendency of analysts toward optimistic
forecasts, and vice versa. The following two sections describe the step-by-step process of
the MFFE method.

4.2.1

Mean Quarterly Forecast Error (MQFE) and Frequency of Negative
Forecast Errors

The mean-frequency forecast error (MFFE) method is the main portfolio
formation method used to classify observations (firm-quarters) into quintile portfolios
indicating a spectrum of analysts' forecasting behavior. The first step of the mean47

Recall that negative forecast errors represent optimistic forecasts, while positive forecast errors indicate
pessimistic forecasts.
47

frequency method is to calculate the mean of quarterly earnings forecast errors over the
past 20 quarters prior to the earnings announcement. At each quarterly earnings
announcement, I look back 20 calendar quarters and calculate the mean quarterly forecast
error ( MQFE t , 20 ):
MQFEt , 20 =

1 20 At − q − Ft − q
,
∑
20 q =1 Pt − q −1

(4-1)

where
q

= 1 through 20 quarters prior to the quarterly announcement at time t;

At − q

= the reported (actual) EPS for the quarter t-q;

Ft − q

= the recent forecasted EPS for the quarter t-q; and

Pt −q −1 = the stock price 10 days prior to the quarter t-q.
The negative MQFEs imply that analysts' optimism in earnings forecasts has
dominated analysts' pessimism at least in terms of the magnitude of the past negative
forecast errors, but not necessarily in terms of the frequency of those. So, forming
portfolios based only on MQFEs may lead to a misclassification problem. For example,
suppose that a firm at quarter t has one large negative forecast error 20 quarters before
and 19 small positive forecast errors since then, and the magnitude of one negative
forecast error outweighs the sum of 19 small positive forecast errors. The firm is likely to
be assigned to the optimistic portfolio if the MQFE is used as the only formation method.
Arguably, it would be more appropriate that the firm be classified into the pessimistic
portfolio in this case, considering analysts' dominant tendency toward pessimistic
forecasts.
48

The frequency of negative earnings forecast errors means the number of negative
forecast errors for 20 quarters prior to the earnings announcement, and the maximum
frequency is accordingly 20. The higher frequency indicates the higher likelihood that
analysts on average generate optimistic contemporaneous earnings forecasts, resulting in
negative contemporaneous forecast errors. Using the frequency measure as an
independent portfolio formation method is not free of the misclassification problem. For
instance, suppose that a firm at quarter t has an even distribution of negative and positive
forecast errors over 20 quarters prior to the quarter t − that is, 10 negative and 10 positive
forecast errors. Also assume that the magnitudes of the 10 negative forecast errors far
outweigh those of the 10 positive. If the frequency measure is strictly applied, the firm
will be classified into a rational portfolio meaning that analysts' forecasts have been
unbiased. This classification is, however, problematic. The fact that when analysts
overestimate the actual earnings they persistently do it by a greater amount than when
they underestimate the actual earnings is itself a form of analysts' forecast bias more
leaning toward optimistic forecasts.
The above discussions naturally suggest that a portfolio formation method
combining the two measures (MQFE and frequency) will do a better job on forming
portfolios that proxy analysts' forecasting behavior prior to the quarterly earnings
announcement. Panels A and B of Table 2 present a summary of the MFFE method.
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4.2.2

Portfolio Formation

I first pool all observations (firm-quarters) and then rank them on the basis of the
two measures: MQFE t , 20 and the frequencies of negative forecast errors. The ranking
process using each measure produces the quintile groups of firm-quarters where the
quintiles of each measure represents the variability of analysts' forecasting behavior from
the most optimistic to the most pessimistic group in the ranking order. In Panel A of Table
2, for both the MQFE and frequency measures Quintile 1 (Q1) indicates the quintile group
containing the most optimistic firm-quarters, while Quintile 5 (Q5) indicates the quintile
group including the most pessimistic firm-quarters.
When I combine the two measures, I end up having a contingency table containing
25 subsets − all possible combinations of the MQFE-based and the frequency-based
rankings. The firm-quarters in the cell (Q1, Q1) are observations that are expected to have
the most optimistic contemporaneous forecast errors, while the cell (Q5, Q5) contains
firm-quarters that are expected to be followed by the most pessimistic contemporaneous
forecast errors [Panels A and B of Table 2]. The numbers in parentheses indicate firmquarters and number of firms, respectively.
Given the possible combinations as in Panel A of Table 2, I assign firm-quarters
into 5 portfolios on the basis of both the magnitude and the frequency of the past 5-year
forecast errors. P1 (P5) indicates the most optimistic (pessimistic) portfolio that consists of
firm-quarters with larger negative (positive) MQFEs and higher (lower) frequencies of

50

negative forecast errors over the 20-quarter period prior to the earnings announcement.
Whether these are useful depends upon whether they have predictive power for the
contemporaneous forecast errors. As we shall see later, from the statistical point of view,
P1 is an optimistic portfolio and P5 is a pessimistic portfolio. Labels of P2, P3, and P4 are,
however, less obvious than those of P1 and P5, since inferences from the MQFE measure
and the frequency measure are more controversial in case of the former portfolios than the
latter. I, hence, put more emphasis on P1 and P5 than the rest in testing the proposed
hypotheses. The notations P1-P5 have consistent meanings hereafter. P1 means the most
optimistic portfolio and P5 is defined as the most pessimistic portfolio no matter what kind
of portfolio formation method is used.

4.3

Mean-Frequency Time-Series (MFTS) Method

As noted earlier in this chapter, the MFFE method might face serious Type II error
problem resulting from misclassification. Investors may consider other factors when
imputing bias to analysts’ forecasts, so that the MFFE may not adequately capture
analysts’ forecast bias that investors perceive. In the following sections I introduce a timeseries regression model used by De Bondt and Thaler (1990; DBT hereafter) and develop
another classification method by combining the DBT model with the MFFE method to
reduce Type II error.
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4.3.1

Estimation of De Bondt and Thaler (DBT) Model

The following DBT model is the restatement of Equation (2-3):
At − At −1 = δ 0 + δ1 ( Ft − At −1 ) + et′

(4-2)

⇔ AECt = δ 0 + δ1 FECt + et′

(4-3)

where
AECt = the actual earnings change from quarter t-1 to quarter t;
FECt = the analyst-forecasted earnings change from quarter t-1 to quarter t; and
Other terms are as defined earlier.
For each firm-quarter observation, the De Bondt and Thaler (DBT) model is
estimated over the 20 quarters prior to the contemporaneous earnings announcement.
Negative intercepts ( δ 0 s ), in general, indicate optimistic analysts' forecasts during the
period, holding the slope coefficient ( δ1 ) constant, say "1" for simplicity. Holding δ 0
constant, say "0", slope coefficients ( δ1s ) less than one and greater than zero also suggest
that analysts have been optimistic. Together with the condition of 0 < δ1 <= 1 , larger
negative δ 0 s mean that analysts have produced overly optimistic forecasts. As a result,
firm-quarters with negative δ 0 s and positive but less-than-one δ1s are assigned to
optimistic portfolios. More specifically, I rank δ 0 s and δ1s in quintiles respectively and
obtain a table that has possible combinations (25 subsets) of δ 0 and δ1 quintiles [Panel C
of Table 2]. Lower δ 0 quintiles are likely to have negative δ 0 s implying analysts'
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optimism. Similarly, lower δ1 quintiles are expected to contain δ1s smaller than one and
larger than zero, again indicating analysts' optimism.
Conversely, positive δ 0 s and greater-than-one δ1s are indications of analysts'
pessimism during the past 5 years prior to the earnings announcement. Higher δ 0 and δ1
quintiles, therefore, are likely to capture analysts' pessimism. Based on the newly formed
subsets, I create quintile portfolios over the 5-year formation period. Again, portfolios P1
through P5 represent the range of analysts’ forecasting behavior from the most optimistic
to the most pessimistic.

4.3.2

Portfolio Formation

After applying the MFFE and the DBT methods, I end up with ten portfolios: 5
from the former and 5 from the latter. I draw another contingency table having 25 subsets
of the two portfolio formation methods as shown in Panel D of Table 2. To make sure that
the new portfolios minimize possible misclassification problems from applying either the
MFFE or the DBT model, I select the 5 diagonal subsets to form 5 new portfolios. The
new P1 includes the firm-quarters that were classified as P1 by both the MFFE method
and the DBT model. Similarly, the firm-quarters, ranked as P5 in both the MFFE and the
DBT model, are placed into the new P5. Although this new method (MFTS) decreases the
sample size, it is useful to perform a robustness test for the main portfolio formation
method − the MFFE method.
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Chapter 5
Data and Abnormal Return Measures

5.1

Data

The sample used in this research includes quarterly analysts’ consensus earnings
forecasts and reported (or actual) earnings per share (EPS), as well as price and return
data. Quarterly analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts and reported EPS are taken from
the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Assuming that firms announce their
quarterly earnings before the beginning of the next quarter, I collect the most recent
quarterly consensus earnings forecasts that are available on the I/B/E/S Summary tape.
Analysts’ earnings forecast errors are calculated using reported earnings from the I/B/E/S
Actual tape. Stock price and return information are extracted from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily database. COMPUSTAT is also used to collect
the market value and the book value of common equity.
As noted by some studies, I/B/E/S has a reporting lag problem. According to
O’Brien (1988), average reporting lag between analysts’ forecast dates and I/B/E/S
reporting dates is 34 trading days, and it has a standard deviation of 44.5 trading days.
She argues that the reporting lag may induce a measurement error in analysts' forecasts.
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) contend that such measurement error might cause a
downward bias on the coefficient of analysts' forecast changes used in De Bondt and
Thaler (1990), and this might induce overreaction results. Although Cornell and
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Landsman (1989) report that the average reporting lag of I/B/E/S is improved to 10 days,
it would be appropriate for researchers to endeavor to minimize the lag problem when
they collect earnings forecast information from I/B/E/S. To make sure that earnings
forecasts for the contemporaneous quarter reflects recent earnings information, the
I/B/E/S consensus forecasts closest to the earnings announcement dates are used.
Alleviating the reporting lag problem results in better measurement of unexpected new
earnings information by decreasing the expected portion of new earnings information.
To be included in the final sample, each firm should have at least 21 consecutive
quarters of data for actual and forecasted EPS on I/B/E/S. This ensures that firm-quarters
are properly classified into portfolios on the basis of either the MFFE or the MFTS
method. In addition, for every firm in the sample, 250 days of CRSP return data prior to
the quarterly earnings announcement is needed for the calculation of market-model
adjusted 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).48 The initial number of observations
is 137,065 firm-quarters (7447 firms) that are available on both I/B/E/S and CRSP. Due to
the look-back portfolio formation process, 20 firm-quarters of data are removed from
each firm and this reduces the sample to 47,118 firms-quarters (2284 firms). After
removing observations with missing values, the sample size is further reduced to 39,249
firm-quarters (2002 firms).
My sample selection procedures and the use of I/B/E/S / CRSP / COMPUSTAT
intersected data may introduce survivorship bias, but related literature has shown that

48

The 3-day CARs are computed by adding market-model adjusted daily abnormal returns from -2 (2 days
prior to the earnings announcement) to 0 (the earnings announcement) [see Section 5.2].
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survivorship bias has little effect on tests for stock price performance [Bernard and
Thomas (1989); Ball and Kothari (1989)].
COMPUSTAT is used to extract firm-quarters’ equity information: the book value
of equity (BVE) and the market value of equity (MVE). The firms included in the final
sample are, as a result, the ones listed on the I/B/E/S tape for at least 21 quarters, and on
the CRSP daily return tape for at least 250 days prior to the earnings announcement. They
should also have BVE and MVE available on COMPUSTAT. After intersecting the sample
of 39,249 firm-quarters from I/B/E/S and CRSP with the quarterly COMPUSTAT data,
quite a few observations are further removed, and the final sample size for the MFFE
method is 34,605 firm-quarters (1882 firms).49 The sample covers a 12-year period from
1990 to 2001. One enhancement over other studies [Cornell and Landsman (1989);
Moses (1991)] is that I do not restrict the sample to firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ with December fiscal-year ends.
Given the above argument, the sample includes quarterly analysts' earnings
forecasts, quarterly actual earnings, daily stock returns, the market value of equity
(MVE), the book-to-market ratio, and other necessary variables subject to the following
criteria:
1) The final sample firms are required to be covered on CRSP, COMPUSTAT,
and I/B/E/S.

49

The final sample for the MFTS method is formed by intersecting the sample [27,635 firm-quarters (2009
firms)] from the DBT model with the sample [34,605 firm-quarters (1882 firms)] from the MFFE. As
shown on the diagonal in Panel D of Table 2, the final sample for the MFTS consists of 8997 firm-quarters.
Note that the MFFE sample size in Panel A of Table 6 is 34,339 because 266 observations in 1989 are
excluded from analysis. Similarly, the MFTS sample size in Panel B of Table 6 equals 8995, since 2
observations in 1989 are dropped.
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2) Quarterly analysts' consensus earnings forecasts and actual earnings are
available from I/B/E/S summary forecast and actual earnings data tapes. Each
firm-quarter observation is preceded by at least 20 consecutive quarterly
earnings observations.
3) Daily security returns and value-weighted market returns are available from
CRSP for 250 trading days prior to the earnings announcement.
Items 2 and 3 ensure that portfolios can be formed on the basis of analysts’
forecasting behavior and that necessary return information is available. They also make it
possible to estimate the market-model parameters (i.e., alpha and beta) and calculate the
market-model adjusted abnormal returns. As in most earnings announcements literature, 3day [−2:0] CARs are used as the measure of the announcement-period abnormal returns
[Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992); La Porta (1996)].

5.2

Market-Adjusted Abnormal Returns and Market-Model Adjusted Abnormal
Returns

The market-adjusted and market-model adjusted daily abnormal returns for the
common stock of firm i on day t are defined as:
ARitMA = Rit − Rmt ,

(

(5-1)

)

ARitMM = Rit − αˆit + βˆit Rmt ,

(5-2)

where
ARitMA = the market-adjusted abnormal returns of firm i on day t (= -2, -1, 0);
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ARitMM = the market-model adjusted abnormal returns of firm i on day t;
Rit

= the rate of return for the common stock of firm i on day t; and

R mt

= the rate of return on the CRSP value-weighted market index on day t.

For the market-model adjusted abnormal returns, the coefficients α̂it and β̂ ti are
ordinary least squares estimates of firm i’s market model parameters estimated over 240
days from 250 days to 10 days prior to the earnings announcement. For each quarterly
earnings announcement in a firm, ARitMA and ARitMM are calculated.
I compute 3-day [−2: 0] cumulative abnormal returns for the contemporaneous
earnings announcement for firm i (CARit) as follows:50
3

CARit = ∑ ARit

(5-3)

t =1

where
ARit = ARitMA or ARitMM .
The 3-day announcement-period CARs are, then, used as the dependent variable for the
empirical models introduced in Chapter 3.51

50

The use of 3-day [−2: 0] CAR is the norm in earnings studies. It is used to measure the announcementperiod market reaction to analysts' forecast errors.
51
I run the empirical models by using both market adjusted and market-model adjusted CARs as the
dependent variable. I later report the empirical results from the models using the market-model adjusted
CARs, since main results are not affected by different measures of abnormal returns. In addition, the choice
of announcement windows {e.g., 2-day [-1:0] or 1-day [0] CARs} does not affect the main results.
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Chapter 6
Empirical Tests

6.1

Descriptive Statistics

Table 3 summarizes descriptive statistics of 3-day cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs), mean quarterly forecast errors (MQFEs), contemporaneous forecast errors (FEs),
the market value of equity (MVE or Size), the logarithm of MVE (logSize), and book-tomarket ratios (BtoM), and other variables over time and across the 5 portfolios – P1, P2,
P3, P4, and P5. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, these 5 portfolios are formed by either the
MFFE or MFTS methods. In either formation method, P1, P2, P3 represent the optimistic
portfolios, while P4 and P5 are the pessimistic portfolios. P1 and P5 are two extreme
portfolios that indicate the most optimistic and the most pessimistic portfolios
respectively. The classification of P2 and P3 into the optimistic portfolios is somewhat
arbitrary (discussed below).
Panel A of Table 3 reports overall descriptive statistics of major variables.
Consistent with common findings in existing earnings literature, the grand means of
MQFE and FE are significantly negative – i.e., analysts are, on average, optimistic and
analysts' optimism persists. Recall that the forecast error is defined as At − Ft . Negative
MQFEs and FEs imply historical and contemporaneous optimistic analysts' forecasts,
respectively. Notice that the mean CAR is significantly positive, while the mean FE is
significantly negative. This has an important implication regarding the test of the NEH

59

versus the REH. If investors are naïve in reaction to analysts’ forecasting behavior, the
negative FE should lead to negative market reaction – i.e., negative CAR. The negative
FE is, instead, associated with the positive CAR. This suggests that investors have
discounted analysts’ optimism and the NEH does not receive support. This is the first
evidence in favor of the REH.
Although (–) MQFEs outnumbers (+) MQFEs, the number of (–) FEs is less than
that of (+) FEs.52 This suggests that analysts tend to issue pessimistic forecasts more
frequently, while the absolute magnitudes of optimistic forecast errors are larger than
those of pessimistic ones. Given this observation about frequency versus magnitude, it is
not obvious whether analysts' earnings forecast bias is characterized by optimism.
Therefore, either MQFEs or the frequency of (–) FEs alone may not be sufficient to
characterize analysts' forecasting behavior. Also notice that 4247 FEs – about 12% of
total observations – are zero. Non-trivial number of analysts’ forecasts accurately hit the
actual earnings. In what circumstances are unbiased forecasts issued? Is this an indication
of earnings management? Individual characteristics of analysts might be the main reason,
or certain firm characteristics may play a key role in producing unbiased forecasts.
Investigating these issues warrants future research.
Panel B of Table 3 shows that absolute values of average MQFE (AMQFET) and
average FE (AFET) tend to decrease over time, indicating that analysts' optimistic
forecast bias has been mitigated.53 Kendall's Tau’s between AMQFET and time (i.e.,

52

Note that I use the notation (-) for "negative" and the notation (+) for "positive".
Notice I use a subscript "T" with the variable names to indicate that variables are time-wise, not
portfolio-wise. I use a subscript "P" to indicate portfolio-wise variables. For example, AMQFET indicates
average MQFE for a specific year "T", while AMQFEP means average MQFE for a portfolio "P".

53
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years) and AFET and time are −0.91 and −0.64 significant at the conventional significance
levels. Although average logSize (AlogSizeT) exhibit some extent of decreasing patterns
over time (Kendall's Tau is −0.42 significant at the 10% level), there seems to be no
significant trend for either average CAR (ACART). Similarly, average BtoM (ABtoMT)
have no significant trend.
On the other hand, Panel C of Table 3 documents that portfolios possess some
distinct characteristics in terms of the firm size and the book-to-market ratio. The average
CAR (ACARP) and average BtoM (ABtoMP) tend to be larger for the optimistic portfolios
than for the pessimistic ones. The average firm size (AlogSizeP) monotonically increases
as the portfolios change from P1 to P2 to P3 to P4 to P5. In sum, ACARP is negatively
associated with AlogSizeP and positively with ABtoMP. The former relation indicates the
size effect, while the latter implies the profitability of the value-firm investments [Fama
and French (1993, 1995)]. Panels D, E, F of Table 3 contain descriptive statistics using
the MFTS method and show very consistent results with ones using the MFFE.

6.2

Validity of Portfolio Formation Methods

Developing a valid portfolio formation method is critical to examine the two main
behavioral issues in this study: 1) Persistent bias; 2) Investors' reaction to analysts'
forecasting behavior. The validity of the two formation methods – MFFE and MFTS –
depends on their predictive power for the contemporaneous average forecast errors
(AFEP) and the percentage of the negative contemporaneous FEs [%(–FE)]. For instance,
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the most optimistic portfolio (P1) should have the largest negative mean of
contemporaneous FEs and the highest %(–FE) for my portfolio formation methods
(MFFE and MFTS) to be valid. Panel C of Table 3 shows that for P1, the mean
contemporaneous FE is indeed significantly negative, and is the most negative. %(–FE)
is also highest. The binomial tests in Table 4 indicate that the portfolio P1's %(–FE) is
53% for the MFFE and 55% for the MFTS and both are significantly greater than 50%.
Therefore, P1 is indeed an optimistic portfolio consistent with the predictions of both the
MFFE and the MFTS methods. It should be noted that examining the validity of the
portfolio formation methods is a joint test of bias and persistence in analysts' earnings
forecasts in the sense that the MFFE and the MFTS are based on historical analysts'
forecast bias that continues into the current period.
As predicted by the MFFE and the MFTS, P4 and P5 have significantly positive
AFEP and the percentage of positive FEs [%(+FE)] outweighs that of %(–FE). The
magnitudes of AFEP and %(+FE) for P5 are greater than those for P4. These results are
exactly what was intended by the MFFE and the MFTS methods. The results in Panels C
and F of Table 3, therefore, suggest that the MFFE and the MFTS methods are valid in
the sense of providing statistically reliable predictions of contemporaneous forecast
errors, at least for portfolios P1, P4, and P5. More importantly, this implies that the
persistent bias presumption manifested in the MFFE and the MFTS methods receives
support.
For P2 and P3, the predictability of the two methods is not as clear as the other
portfolios. For both the MFFE and the MFTS methods, %(–FE) is not consistent with the
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predictions of the two methods. Actually, it is contradictory. While AFEP for P2 and P3
have predicted signs (i.e., negative), %(–FE) is smaller than or not significantly different
from %(+FE). According to Panels C and F of Table 3, %(–FE)'s for P2 and P3 are 48%
and 46% for the MFFE and 49% and 45% for the MFTS. The binomial tests in Table 4
indicate that those %(–FE)'s are significantly less than 50% except for %(–FE) for P2
formed by the MFTS, which is not significantly different from 50%. P2 and P3 are, thus,
not as convincing as the others in terms of predictive power.
I classify P2 into an optimistic portfolio because its AFEP’s (–0.00057 for the
MFFE and –0.00054 for the MFTS) are significantly negative [and more negative than
the grand mean of forecast errors (–0.00048)] and the difference between %(–FE) and
%(+FE) is not so wide. As pointed out earlier, Panel B of Table 4 shows that P2's %(–
FE) is not significantly different from %(+FE).
Although P3 has significantly negative AFEP, it is smaller than the grand mean (–
0.00048) in terms of absolute value, and %(–FE) is significantly smaller than %(+FE) for
both the MFFE and the MFTS methods [Panels C and F of Table 3 and Panels A and B of
Table 4]. It is, thus, difficult to assign P3 into either an optimistic or a pessimistic
portfolio. I arbitrarily assign P3 into an optimistic portfolio, since it has significantly
negative AFEP whose definition is consistent with the definition of analysts' optimism in
this study.54 It would be, however, also possible for one to argue that P3 may be
classified into a rational portfolio. But, it does not receive any statistical support.
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As a result, there is no rational portfolio in the 5 portfolios (at least from the statistical point of view).
This, however, should not be a problem because the main objective of the dissertation is to find the relation
of investors’ reaction to analysts’ biased forecasting behavior, not to unbiased forecasting behavior.
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The persistent bias in analysts’ forecasts is an important and necessary condition
to examine investor rationality in response to analysts’ forecast errors. Evidence that the
MFFE and the MFTS methods are valid measures of predicting the contemporaneous
forecast errors suggests that analysts’ forecast bias is persistent. Given that analysts tend
to make persistent upward (optimistic) or downward (pessimistic) bias in their forecasts,
investors’ reaction to analysts’ forecast errors is expected to reveal investor rationality in
forming conditional earnings expectations of their own.
At least for the extreme portfolios P1 and P5, the predictability of the two
portfolio formation methods is obvious. P4 is also as predictable in terms of both mean
and frequency of FEs. When it comes to the interpretation of empirical results from the
multiple regression models used to test the NEH against the REH, I place more weight on
the "extreme" portfolios – the portfolio P1 and the portfolio P5 – to avoid possible
debates over the validity of the formation methods especially in case of P2 and P3.
To further examine the persistence in analysts’ earnings forecasts, I perform both
parametric and non-parametric autocorrelation tests. Panels A and B of Table 5 report
results from a nonparametric Chi-square test of autocorrelation between FEt −1 and
FEt .55 If analysts’ earnings forecasts do not display any persistent bias, the observed
frequencies should equal the theoretical ones. If there are no significant differences
between the observed and theoretical frequencies, the Chi-square test fails to reject the
null hypothesis that the observed frequencies are equal to the theoretical. But, the data
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Gujarati (1988; pp. 373-375).
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shows that the Chi-square statistic is significant at the 1% level, and suggests that the
signs of FEs tend to stay in the same direction between quarter t-1 and quarter t.
I also perform a simple parametric test in Panels C and D of Table 5. The test
consists of the estimation of the first-order autoregressive model [i.e., AR (1)], both on
the pooled sample and each portfolio, to see whether an autocorrelation structure exists
between FEt −1 and FEt . I found that the autocorrelation between the consecutive FEs
was positive and highly significant, indicating the signs of FEs do not change rapidly.
These results confirm that analysts’ forecast bias is persistent.
To see whether there is clustering within portfolios or across portfolios on various
factors that might influence analysts’ forecast bias, I compute three Herfindahl indexes:
1) Time Herfindahl; 2) Industry Herfindahl; 3) Stock Exchange Herfindahl [Table 6].
Time Herfindahl index measures the relative concentration of a portfolio over the 12-year
study period. Industry Herfindahl index calibrates the relative concentration of an
industry sector across portfolios, while Stock Exchange Herfindahl gauges the relative
concentration of a stock exchange across portfolios. The three Herfindahl indexes are
calculated as follows:
 FREQt , P 
HP = ∑


t =1  FREQsum , P 
12

2

(6-1)

H IND

 FREQ p , IND 
= ∑ 

p =1  FREQsum , IND 

H EX

 FREQ p , EX
= ∑

p =1  FREQsum , EX

5

5
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2

(6-2)

2

(6-3)

where
HP

= the Herfindahl index for a portfolio P where P = P1, …, P5;

H IND

= the Herfindahl index for an industry IND where IND = 1, …, 11;

H EX

= the Herfindahl index for a stock exchange EX where EX = NYSE,
AMEX, NASDAQ;

FREQt , P

= the marginal frequency of a portfolio P in year t; and

FREQ p , IND = the marginal frequency of an industry IND for a portfolio p;
FREQ p , EX

= the marginal frequency of a stock exchange EX for a portfolio p;

FREQ sum, P = the aggregate frequency of portfolio p over the 12-year period;
FREQ sum, IND = the aggregate frequency of an industry IND across portfolios; and
FREQ sum, EX = the aggregate frequency of an exchange EX across portfolios.
For Time Herfindahl index, portfolios for which all observations fall in a specific
year will have a Herfindahl index of 1. Portfolios, which have observations spread evenly
through time, will have a Herfindahl index of 0.0833. To illustrate, suppose that all
observations in P1 are clustered in 1990 so that no observations in P1 can be found in any
other years. The marginal frequency of P1 in 1990 ( FREQ1990, P1 ) equals the aggregate
frequency of P1 over the 12-year period ( FREQsum, P1 ), while the marginal frequencies of
P1 for any other years are zero. Then, the Time-Herfindahl index for P1 ( H P1 ) equals
one. If all observations in P1 are evenly spread across years, H P1 becomes

1
(=0.0833).
12

The data in Panels A and B of Table 6 suggests that all portfolios are well spread over the
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sample time period and implies that the persistent bias in analysts' forecasts is not
dominated by a specific year.
Industry Herfindahl and Stock Exchange Herfindahl indexes provide similar
evidence. Panels C~F reflect that industries and exchanges seem to be well scattered
across portfolios, since Industry Herfindahl and Stock Exchange Herfindahl indexes are,
in most cases, close to 0.2.56 In other words, industry and stock exchange factors are not
significant determinants of the persistent bias in analysts' forecasts.
It is reasonable to say that past forecasting behavior, measured by the MFFE or
the MFTS, has predictive ability with respect to contemporaneous analysts’ earnings
forecasts. Note again that I use "forecasting behavior" as a synonym of persistent bias in
analysts’ forecasts. Recognizing the existence of persistent bias in analysts’ earnings
forecasts, I turn to the issue of how investors are expected to react to analysts’ forecasting
behavior.

6.3

Empirical Tests of NEH versus REH

As discussed in Chapter 3, three multiple regression models are estimated to test
the NEH versus the REH. The following are the restatements of the three models
described in Chapter 3 [i.e., Equations (3-3), (3-4), and (3-5)]:57
56

The Herfindahl index for an industry or an exchange will be "0.2" if observations in the same industry or
exchange are equally distributed across portfolios, while it will be "1" if observations in the same industry
or exchange are clustered in a specific portfolio.
57
I reexamined the three models with time dummies for quarters and the inclusion of time dummies does
not alter the main findings of the models without dummies. The models including time dummies are
econometrically more appropriate since by doing so the error terms have zero means every quarter. I also
performed autocorrelation test on the error terms for the three models (with time dummies) and found no
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CARt = α1 P1 + α 2 P2 + α 3 P3 + α 4 P4 + α 5 P5 + β1diffSizet + β 2 diffBtoM t + ut
CARt = a1 P1 + a2 P2 + a3 P3 + a4 P4 + a5 P5 + b1

FEt
STDt

+b2 diffSizet + b3 diffBtoM t + υt
CARt = a1′ + a2′ P2 + a3′ P3 + a4′ P4 + a5′ P5 + b1′
+b4′

(6-4)

(6-5)
FEt
FEt
FEt
P2 + b3′
P3
+ b2′
STD
STD
STD

FEt
FEt
P4 + b5′
P5 + b6′ diffSizet + b7′ diffBtoM t + ωt
STDt
STDt

(6-6)

Terms are as defined earlier, and firm subscripts are omitted for convenience.
Panel A of Table 7 shows results from the estimation of Equation (6-4). The NEH
predicts that naïve investors naïvely follow analysts' optimism and their reaction to such
optimism (i.e., negative forecast errors=bad news) on average leads to negative CARs,
while naïve investors' reaction to analysts' pessimism (i.e., positive forecast errors=good
news) results in positive CARs.58 Under the NEH, therefore, the market reaction to the
earnings announcement would be negative for optimistic portfolios (e.g., P1) and positive
for pessimistic portfolios (e.g., P5). Specifically, the NEH expects that α 5 is greater than

α1 . The REH, however, hypothesizes that rational investors do not perceive analysts'
optimism or pessimism as bad news or good news, since they fully adjust for analysts'
forecasting behavior (i.e., optimism or pessimism) so that the contemporaneous negative

significant autocorrelation structure. For the MFFE method, the correlations between the contemporaneous
error term and the lagged error term were 0.044, -0.015, and 0.096 respectively for the three models and
they are all insignificant. Similar results were found for the MFTS method. Durban-Watson statistics also
suggest that there is no first-order autocorrelation.
58
Recall that the average forecast error for P1 (the most optimistic portfolio) is significantly negative,
while the average forecast error for P5 (the most pessimistic) is significantly positive.
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or positive forecast errors do not have an impact on rational investors' reaction to the
earnings announcement. As a consequence, under the REH, the average market reaction
(i.e., α1 ) for P1 should not be significantly different from α 5 .
The regression results in Panel A of Table 7 indicate that no pair-wise comparison
between portfolio abnormal returns is significant; the NEH that investors are naïve
followers of analysts' forecasts is rejected. I also perform Scheffe's multiple comparison
method to test all possible contrasts at the same time. Considering that the portfolio
sample sizes are unequal, Scheffe's method may be preferred to other pair-wise
comparisons (e.g., F-tests or Tukey's method). The results from Scheffe's method also
display no significantly different pairs. Also recall that the negative mean FE is
associated with the positive mean CAR (Panel A of Table 3). Therefore, the NEH is
rejected in favor of the REH.
Panel B of Table 7 documents the regression results from estimating Equation (65). According to the MFFE the estimate of the dummy variable P1 (i.e., fixed or intercept
market effect for P1) is significantly larger than that of P5 – i.e., a1 > a 5 . For both the
MFFE and the MFTS, a1 (0.00359 and 0.00427) is greater than a 5 (0.00178 and
0.00214), and the F-test for the MFFE rejects the null hypothesis (Ho: a1 = a 5 ) at the 5%
level. These are in compliance with the predictions of the REH. But, the F-test for the
MFTS fails to reject Ho: a1 = a 5 with p-value of 0.1848. In addition, the results from
Scheffe’s multiple comparisons disclose that all pairs of the portfolio dummy estimates
are not significantly different from each other − i.e., a1 = a 2 = a 3 = a 4 = a 5 . Therefore,
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the data does not strongly reject the NEH. These results are, however, based on the
assumption that the marginal market effects [slopes in Equation (6-5)] of all portfolios
are the same.
Equation (6-6) releases the assumption of equal portfolio slopes and uses P1 as
the reference portfolio (I do not display all possible regression results based on different
reference portfolios because the focus is on the extreme portfolios). Panels C-1 and C-2
of Table 7 indicate that for the MFFE a1′ (0.00359) is significantly greater than a1′ + a5′
(0.00199) with p-value of 0.0671. They also show that the slope (marginal) market effect
of P1 (i.e., b1′ =0.0021) is not significantly different from that of P5 (i.e., b1′ + b5′ =0.00179)
with p-value of 0.1234. However, the MFTS does not fully conform the MFFE’s results
by failing to reject Ho: a1′ = a1′ + a5′ . Moreover, Scheffe’s multiple comparisons show no
significant pairs of portfolio intercepts. Similar to the findings in Panel B, the data does
not strongly reject the NEH.
In summary, regressions provide mixed evidence. One model [Equation (6-4)]
rejects the NEH and supports the REH. The other two models, on the other hand, do not
strongly reject the NEH.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions

Prior studies have reported that analysts’ earnings forecasts are upward or
downward biased, and economic and non-economic incentives have been provided to
explain such observed bias. Management access and career (reputation) concerns are,
among others, the examples of economic incentives for analysts to issue biased earnings
forecasts. Michaely and Womack (1999) and Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000)
document that financial analysts of brokerage firms tend to issue more favorable
recommendations or earnings growth forecasts due to the underwriting relationships with
the company they follow. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) contend that analysts deliberately
report earnings forecasts that are closer to or further from the consensus because of career
concerns.
Another group of explanations draws from the behavioral finance literature to
suggest that analysts suffer from cognitive failures. While De Bondt and Thaler (1990)
argue that analysts tend to overreact to new earnings information and their forecasts are
thus extreme, Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) and Mendenhall (1991), among others,
conjecture that analysts appear to underreact to new earnings information. As discussed
earlier, Easterwood and Nutt (1999) reconcile the overreaction and the underreaction
views by demonstrating that analysts, in fact, overreact to good news and underreact to
bad news. Such systematic overreaction and underreaction results in analysts’ optimism
in earnings forecasts.
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This dissertation explores whether analysts' forecast bias is persistent (i.e.,
whether the historical record of analysts’ forecasting behavior has predictive ability with
respect to subsequent forecast errors), and then proposes two competing hypotheses – the
NEH and the REH – to examine how investors respond to the persistent bias in analysts’
earnings forecasts, if they are indeed persistent. The NEH surmises that investors take
analysts’ forecasts as unbiased and these naïve investors’ earnings expectations are
identical to analysts’ earnings forecasts. Empirically, this prediction leads to the
conclusion that naïve investors’ reaction to a given analyst forecast error (holding other
factors constant) does not vary with the observed persistent bias in analysts’ earnings
forecasts – optimistic or pessimistic. Recall that I use the term “analysts’ forecasting
behavior” as a synonym of “the observed persistent bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts”.
The REH, in contrast, presumes that investors discount or place a premium on the
persistent bias, and thus, these rational investors’ earnings expectations are different from
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Specifically, under the REH investors’ reaction to a given
analyst forecast error varies systematically with analysts’ forecasting behavior.
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 convey important implications regarding
analysts’ forecast bias and predictive power of the two portfolio formation methods used
in the dissertation. The overall descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 3 suggest that
investors, on average, tend to discount analysts’ optimism in earnings forecasts that
characterizes average analysts’ forecasting behavior. Although the trend is not
monotonic, Panels B and E exhibit that average analysts’ optimism tends to be attenuated
over time. Non-trivial number of zero forecast errors, on the other hand, gives credence
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to earnings management. In addition, Panels C and F reveal systematic size and book-tomarket association with forecast errors.
Panels C and F of Table 3 show that the portfolio formation methods (MFFE and
METS) successfully create an optimistic portfolio (P1) and a pessimistic one (P5)
consistent with the predictions of both formation methods. For P1, the mean of
contemporaneous forecast errors (AFE) is indeed significantly negative (actually most
negative), and the percentage of negative forecast errors is highest, as predicted by both
methods. The similar results are found for P5; AFE is significantly positive and the
percentage of positive forecast errors outweighs that of negative ones. The binomial test
of the hypothesis that the probability of getting positive forecast errors equals 0.5
confirms the validity of the formation methods by rejecting the hypothesis for both
portfolios. Note again that the validity test of the formation methods is a joint test of
analysts’ forecast bias and its persistence, in the sense that the formation methods are
based on the premise that historical analysts’ forecast bias persists into the current period.
The persistence in analysts’ earnings forecasts is further examined using various
parametric and non-parametric tests. The non-parametric Chi-square tests and the firstorder autoregressive models suggest that there is a significant autocorrelation between
FE t −1 and FE t . The three Herfindahl indexes provide evidence that each portfolio is well
spread over time and across industries and stock exchanges. This reflects that the
persistent bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts is not characterized by such factors as time,
industry, or stock exchanges.
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Multiple regression methodology is used to determine whether investors respond
differently based on evidence of prior persistent bias in analysts’ forecasts. The
regressions are intended to contrast naïve investors' reaction to analysts' forecast bias
with rational investors' reaction to such bias. Equation (6-4) investigates the average
market reactions of optimistic and pessimistic portfolios controlling for size and book-tomarket ratio. Unlike Equations (6-5) and (6-6), Equation (6-4) incorporates the impact of
the average forecast errors in portfolios into the intercept effect. So, the average FEs in
respective portfolios are reflected in the magnitudes of the dummy variable coefficients
( α1 ,…, α 5 ). The NEH predicts that the coefficient for P1 ( α1 ) should be smaller than that
for P5 ( α 5 ), since naïve investors' reaction to analysts' optimism (pessimism) will, on
average, be negative (positive).59
The REH, on the other hand, conjectures that α1 and α 5 will be statistically
indistinguishable, since rational investors do not perceive analysts' optimism or
pessimism as bad news or good news. In other words, rational investors fully discount
analysts' contemporaneous optimistic forecasts or place a fully-adjusted premium on
analysts' contemporaneous pessimistic forecasts, so that the corresponding negative
(optimistic) or positive (pessimistic) forecast errors do not influence rational investors'
reaction. The regression results support the REH. This is consistent with the implication
of the negative relationship between the grand mean of analysts’ forecast errors and the
grand mean of the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).

59

Note that analysts' optimism (negative forecast errors) indicates bad news, while analysts' pessimism
(positive forecast errors) conveys good news.
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Equations (6-5) and (6-6) enhance Equation (6-4) by including the
contemporaneous forecast errors as an explanatory variable. As shown in Table 1, given a
forecast error (FE), naïve and rational investors' reactions to prior bias in analysts'
forecasts can be contrasted. Under the NEH, given an FE, investors' reaction to analysts'
PESS
optimism should equal that to analysts' pessimism: CARt |OPT
NEH = CARt | NEH . Under the

REH, given an FE, investors will adjust for analysts' optimism or pessimism. As a result,
given an FE, rational investors' reaction to analysts' optimism (pessimism) should be
larger (smaller) than naïve investors' reaction to analysts' forecast bias: CARt |OPT
REH >
CARt |NEH > CARt |PESS
REH . The estimated parameters and pair-wise comparisons of
Equations (6-5) and (6-6) do not strongly reject the NEH. While the MFFE results reject
the NEH in favor of the REH, the MFTS results do not confirm it. With evidence of the
persistent bias in analysts' earnings forecasts, the regression results suggest that the
functional form [ CARt = f ( FEt ) ] commonly used in earnings literature may not
appropriately capture the effect of real unexpected earnings information (i.e., investors'
expectation errors as opposed to analysts' forecast errors) on stock returns.
For the non-extreme portfolios (P2, P3, and P4) the data does not yet provide a
clear cut-off for either the NEH or the REH. Actually, it shows results that are not
predicted by either the NEH or the REH. Having known that the extreme-portfolio case
does not strongly reject the NEH, I speculate that investors will show some type of quasirational response to less extreme analysts’ forecasting behavior. If investors had
perceived less extreme behavior as unbiased, the market reaction for P1 should have been
equal to that for P3. If investors had fully adjusted for the persistent bias of analysts’
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forecasts, the market reaction for P1 should have dominated that for the P3. The data in
Panel C of Table 7 shows that the market reaction for P3 actually dominates that for P1.
For instance, P3 has greater market reaction than P1 with respect to both fixed ( a1′ versus
a1′ + a3′ ) and marginal effects ( b1′ versus b1′ + b3′ ). Although a1′ and a1′ + a3′ are not
statistically different, b1′ and b1′ + b3′ are significantly different for both the MFFE and
MFTS methods at the 5% level. This implies that for positive forecast errors the market
reaction for P3 dominates that for P1, and this result is not consistent with either the NEH
or the REH. Therefore, the simple dichotomous framework I employed (NEH versus
REH) has a limit to thoroughly examine investors' reaction to analysts' forecasting
behavior.
The limit of my dissertation, however, provides promising opportunities for future
research. One may argue that there exist unidentified (or unidentifiable) risk factors
beyond the dimensions where current risk factors − size, book-to-market ratio, and
momentum effects − are identified. Time periods, industry concentration, or exchange
listings may be potential candidates that drive the differences in the market reaction
across portfolios although it turns out that they are not significant factors to explain
idiosyncratic market reactions. It would be interesting to investigate whether (and/or
how) the characteristics (e.g., experience, brokerage relationship, age, reputation, etc.) of
individual analysts are associated with portfolios formed on the basis of analysts' bias in
consensus earnings forecasts.
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APPENDIX
Figures and Tables Discussed in Text
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FE t /( At - E t | OPT
REH )

OPT

Rational Investors' Expectation Error ( At - E t | REH )
Analysts' Forecast Error ( FE t )
= Naïve Investors’ Expectation
Error ( At - E t | NEH )

450

At

(a)

CARt | OPT
REH
CARt
CARt | NEH

FE t

(b)

Figure 1. Investors’ Earnings Expectations and Reaction to Analysts’
Optimism Under the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH)
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Table 1. Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts versus Investors’ Earnings Expectations and
Predicted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)
Hypothesis
Portfolio

Naïve Expectations Hypothesis
(NEH)

Et |OPT
NEH
Optimistic Portfolio

Æ At − E t |

= Ft
OPT
NEH

OPT

Æ CARt | NEH

Et | RAT
NEH
Rational Portfolio

Æ At − E t |

RAT

Æ CARt | NEH

Et | PESS
NEH
Pessimistic Portfolio

Et |OPT
REH

< Ft
OPT
REH

= At − Ft

Æ At − E t |

= CARt | NEH

Æ CARt | REH

= Ft
RAT
NEH

Rational Expectations Hypothesis
(REH)

OPT

Et | RAT
REH
Æ At − E t |

= CARt | NEH

Æ CARt | REH

PESS

Æ At − E t | NEH = At − Ft
PESS

Æ CARt | NEH = CARt | NEH

> CARt | NEH
= Ft

RAT
REH

= At − Ft

= Ft

> At − Ft

RAT

Et | PESS
REH

= At − Ft
= CARt | NEH
> Ft

PESS

Æ At − E t | REH < At − Ft
PESS

Æ CARt | REH

< CARt | NEH

Note that firm subscripts are omitted.
Definitions of variables are as follows:
= naïve or rational (HYP) investors’ earnings expectations for quarter t in response
E t | BIAS
HYP
to analysts’ BIAS [=optimism (OPT), rational forecasts (RAT), or pessimism
(PESS)] in consensus earnings forecasts under HYP (=NEH or REH);
= analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts for quarter t;
Ft

At − E t | BIAS
HYP = investors’ expectation errors for quarter t under HYP in response to
At − Ft
CARt | NEH
CARt | BIAS
HYP

analysts’ BIAS;
= analysts’ forecast errors for quarter t (FEt);
= naïve investors’ reaction to analysts’ forecast errors manifested in 3-day
[-2: 0] cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for quarter t; and
= naïve or rational (HYP) investors’ reaction to analysts’ BIAS in consensus
earnings forecasts.
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Table 2. Portfolio Formation: Mean-Frequency Forecast Error (MFFE) versus MeanFrequency Time-Series (MFTS) Methods
I use two statistical methods to form the desired portfolios on the basis of analysts’ forecasting
behavior over the past 20 quarters (i.e., 5 years). Panel A summarizes the MFFE method using
the mean and frequency of analysts’ forecast errors over 5 years prior to the quarterly earnings
announcement. Each firm quarter is assigned into one of the quintile portfolios at each earnings
announcement based on the past 5-year mean and frequency. The mean of quarterly forecast
errors (MQFEs) over the 5-year period is calculated as follows:

MQFEt , 20 =

1 20 At − q − Ft − q
∑
20 q =1 Pt − q −1

where

q
At − q

= 1 through 20 quarters prior to the quarterly announcement at time t;

Ft − q

= the forecasted EPS at one month prior to the quarter t-q; and

Pt − q

= the stock price 25 days prior to the quarter t-q.

= the actual EPS for the quarter t-q;

The frequency of quarterly forecast errors indicates the number of negative forecast errors over
the 5-year period. The larger the number is the more optimistic the contemporaneous forecast
error would be. Both measures − i.e., MQFE and the frequency − rank firm-quarters into quintiles
resulting in 25 subsets when a contingency table is constructed. Then, the subsets are redefined
into 5 portfolios as in Panel A.
Panel B presents portfolio formation using the time-series regression model developed by De
Bondt and Thaler (DBT; 1990):

At − At −1 = δ 0 + δ 1 ( Ft − At −1 ) + et′
⇔ AEC t = δ 0 + δ 1 ( FEC t ) + e t′

where

At
Ft
At −1
AECt
FECt

= the contemporaneous reported earnings at quarter t;
= the analysts’ consensus earnings forecast for quarter t;
= the reported earnings one quarter prior to quarter t;

= At − At −1 = actual earnings change; and
= Ft − At −1 = forecasted earnings change;

Recall that the firm subscript is omitted.
Note that both methods form 5 portfolios on the basis of analysts’ past forecasting behavior.
The Mean-Frequency Time-Series (MFTS) method is a combination of the MFFE and the DBT.
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Table 2. Continued.
Panel A. Mean-Frequency Forecast Error (MFFE) Method
MQFE Rank
Frequency Rank
( No of (-) FE)

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q1

P1
(4980, 580)

P1
(3164, 499)

P2
(1264, 250)

(84, 51)

(165, 46)

Q2

P1
(2113, 506)

P2
(2573, 625)

P3
(2229, 522)

(644, 241)

(563, 157)

Q3

P2
(1266, 359)

P3
(2043, 554)

P3
(2807, 697)

P4
(1757, 524)

P4
(1573, 391)

(557, 181)

(945, 316)

(2008, 554)

P4
(2664, 617)

P5
(2510, 556)

(217, 67)

(408, 133)

(825, 281)

P5
(3984, 555)

P5
(4322, 630)

Q4

Q5

Note that the numbers in parentheses indicate firm-quarters and firms respectively.

For both measures (MQFE and Frequency), lower ranks (e.g., Q1) represent more optimism in
analysts’ forecasts during the past 5-year period prior to the earnings announcement. Conversely,
higher ranks (e.g., Q5) indicate less optimism or more pessimism in analysts’ forecasts. Based on
the newly formed subsets, I create 5 portfolios ranging from the most optimistic (P1) to the most
pessimistic (P5).
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Table 2. Continued.
Panel B. Portfolio Characteristics*
Portfolio

Expected Sign of AMQFE a and AFE b
(firm-quarters, firms)

Analysts’ Behavior

Portfolio 1 (P1)

Most Negative
(8512, 909)

Most Optimistic

Portfolio 2 (P2)

Negative
(4482, 978)

Optimistic ?c

Portfolio 3 (P3)

Negative
(6441, 1051)

Optimistic ?c

Portfolio 4 (P4)

Positive
(5340, 907)

Pessimistic

Portfolio 5 (P5)

More Positive
(9830, 1053)

Most pessimistic

* Portfolio definitions are consistent throughout the dissertation.
a

AMQFE indicates average MQFE, which is the grand mean of MQFE for each portfolio:

AMQFEP =

1 N
∑ MQFEP,n
N n =1

where N = the number of observations (MQFEs) in the portfolio P (P=1,2,…,5).
AFE indicates average contemporaneous analysts' forecast errors.
c
As discussed in the text, the classification of these two portfolios may be controversial (They
might be seen as either rational or pessimistic).
b
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Table 2. Continued.
Panel C. Time-Series Portfolio Formation Method (De Bondt & Thaler)*

A t − A t −1 = δ 0 + δ 1 ( F t − A t −1 ) + e t′
Rank of δ 0

1

Rank of

δ1

2

3

4

5

1

P1
(1586, 292)

P1
(1884, 427)

P2
(1784, 411)

P3
(2090, 452)

(1605, 327)

2

P1
(1711, 382)

P2
(1892, 516)

P3
(1904, 511)

(1844, 528)

(1598, 412)

3

P2
(1176, 336)

P3
(1624, 451)

(2250, 522)

(2027, 513)

P4
(1872, 434)

4

P3
(1921, 382)

(1752, 464)

(1682, 456)

P4
(1634, 477)

P5
(1960, 450)

(2555, 383)

(1797, 406)

P4
(1329, 373)

P5
(1354, 365)

P5
(1914, 337)

5

* The time-series model is estimated over the last 5 years (i.e., 20 quarters) at each earnings announcement.
Negative intercepts ( δ 0 s ) likely indicate more optimism in analysts' forecasts resulting in negative forecast
errors, holding the slope coefficient ( δ 1 ) constant. Holding δ 0 constant, slopes less than one and greater
than zero more likely lead to analysts’ pessimism. The ranks of δ 0 and δ 1 , thus, indicate the degree of
either analysts’ optimism or pessimism. Specifically, I rank alphas and betas in quintiles and obtain the
above table that has possible combinations of δ 0 s and δ 1 s quintiles. For both measures, lower ranks
represent more optimism in analysts’ forecasts during the past 5-year period prior to the earnings
announcement. Conversely, higher ranks indicate less optimism or more pessimism in analysts’ forecasts.60
Based on the newly formed subsets, I again create 5 portfolios (P1, …, P5).

60

Note that observations with negative slope coefficients ( δ 1 s ) are dropped for simplicity and clarification

purposes. This should not affect the validity of the classification because δ 1 s are, in most cases, greater
than zero.
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Table 2. Continued.
Now, I have 5 portfolios from the MFFE method and 5 portfolios from the DBT model. The
following MFTS method reconciles the two formation methods and forms another 5 portfolios.
Each portfolio in the MFTS contains observations that are classified into the same portfolio by
both the MFFE and the DBT methods. The following table summarizes the MFTS formation
process:
Panel D. Mean-Frequency Time-Series (MFTS) Method
MFFE
DBT

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

P1

P1
(2965, 470)

(721, 271)

(286, 121)

(10, 7)

(10, 4)

(1446, 420)

P2
(891, 373)

(1022, 350)

(210, 60)

(56, 19)

(1524, 388)

(903, 357)

P3
(1510, 476)

(758, 270)

(776, 207)

(9, 9)

(62, 36)

(493, 189)

P4
(996, 361)

(1962, 489)

(1, 1)

(14, 11)

(100, 55)

(1030, 281)

P5
(2635, 492)

P2

P3

P4

P5
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
This table displays descriptive statistics, including mean, median, and frequency, of variables used
for empirical tests. Definitions of variables are as follows:
= the average cumulative abnormal return
ACAR
=

1
N

N

∑ CAR

n

n =1

where CAR is the 3-day [−2: 0] abnormal stock return for a

quarterly earnings announcement;

AMQFE

=

1
N

N

∑ MQFE
n =1

n

(the average of MQFE)

where MQFEt , 20 =

AFE
Asize

= the average of analysts’ earnings forecast errors (FE);
= the average of market value of equity ( MVE =Size) in millions
N

=

∑ ( P × Shr )
n =1

AlogSize

ABtoM

1 20 At − q − Ft − q
;
∑
20 q =1 Pt − q −1

t ,n

/N

where P is the closing stock price at the third month of quarter t, Shr is the
number of common shares used to calculate EPS at quarter t, and N
is the number of observations;
= the average of the logarithm of MVE ;
= the average of book-to-market ratio
N

=

BVEn

∑ MVE
n =1

/ N where BVE = COMPUSTAT common equity (total);

n

# analysts
(+)% FE
(−)% FE
STD

= the average number of analysts for each portfolio;
= the percentage of positive analysts' forecast errors for each portfolio;
= the percentage of negative analysts' forecast errors for each portfolio; and
= the portfolio mean of the standard deviation of analysts' consensus
forecasts standardized by the mean consensus forecasts.
Other terms are as defined in text. Note that subscripts T and P are omitted.
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Table 3. Continued.
Panel A. Mean-Frequency Forecast Error (MFFE) Method:
Overall Mean, Median, Frequency of CAR, MQFE, FE, Size, logSize, and BtoM
N

Mean

Median

CAR

34605

0.00334***

0.00124

MQFE

34605

-0.00138***

-0.00008

FE

34605

-0.00048***

0

Size

34605

4443.773

909.951

logSize

34605

6.887439

6.81339

BtoM

34605

0.534931

0.47271

(+) Frequency

(−) Frequency

zero Frequency

15544 (44.92%) 19061 (55.08%)

0

17185 (49.66%) 13173 (38.07%) 4247 (12.27%)

*** significant at the 1% level.
** significant at the 5% level.
* significant at the 10% level.
Panel B. MFFE: Means of CAR, MQFE, FE, Size, logSize, and BtoM over Time
N

ACART

AMQFET

AFET

AsizeT

AlogSizeT

ABtoMT

1990

1686

-0.00068

-0.00208***

-0.00142***

3103.00

6.9026

0.6648

1991

2057

-0.00068

-0.00200***

-0.00102***

2968.89

6.8302

0.6470

1992

2480

0.00593***

-0.00201***

-0.00067***

3001.85

6.7745

0.5902

1993

2702

0.00245***

-0.00205***

-0.00059***

3072.00

6.7831

0.5215

1994

3084

0.00256***

-0.00193***

-0.00029***

2927.98

6.7079

0.5187

1995

3199

0.00114

-0.00189***

-0.00064***

3245.01

6.7276

0.5137

1996

3426

0.00429***

-0.00154***

-0.00055***

3957.39

6.8688

0.5006

1997

3589

0.00200***

-0.00116***

-0.00017**

4780.93

7.0425

0.4585

1998

3650

0.00459***

-0.00069***

-0.00041***

5588.20

7.0617

0.4650

1999

3706

0.00849***

-0.00068***

-0.00007

5559.75

6.8851

0.5343

2000

3389

0.00526***

-0.00065***

-0.00007

6899.85

6.9262

0.5877

2001

1371

-0.00146

-0.00049***

-0.00063***

8148.44

7.1466

0.5603
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Table 3. Continued.
Panel C. MFFE: Descriptive Statistics of CAR, MQFE, FE, # of Analysts, STD, Size, logSize, and
BtoM across Portfolios
N

ACARP

AMQFEP

AFEP

median FE

%(+FE)

%(−FE)

P1

8512

0.00352***

-0.00542***

-0.00171***

0.00000

0.47

0.53

P2

4482

0.00427***

-0.00203***

-0.00057***

0.00000

0.52

0.48

P3

6441

0.00395***

-0.00036***

-0.00037***

0.00000

0.54

0.46

P4

5340

0.00305***

0.00041***

0.00014***

0.00008

0.60

0.40

P5

9830

0.00251***

0.00076***

0.00023***

0.00016

0.67

0.33

N

# Analysts

AsizeP

AlogSizeP

ABtoMP

STD

P1

8512

5.01

1315.58

5.9578

0.6905

0.32

P2

4482

6.59

2375.62

6.5209

0.5913

0.22

P3

6441

7.88

4230.72

7.0527

0.4903

0.12

P4

5340

8.35

5794.30

7.3901

0.4672

0.11

P5

9830

8.84

7501.46

7.4782

0.4406

0.09

Note: P1 denotes the most optimistic portfolio; P2 denotes another optimistic portfolio – i.e., less optimistic
than P1 and more optimistic than P3; P3 denotes the least optimistic portfolio – i.e., less optimistic than
both P1 and P2; P4 denotes a less pessimistic portfolio than P5; P5 denotes the most pessimistic portfolio.
Panel D. Mean-Frequency Time-Series (MFTS) Method: Overall Mean, Median, Frequency of CAR,
MQFE, FE, Size, logSize, and BtoM
(+) Frequency

(−) Frequency

N

Mean

Median

CAR

8997

0.00350***

0.00150

MQFE

8997

-0.00179***

-0.00021

3737 (41.54%) 5260 (58.46%)

FE

8997

-0.00066***

0.00003

4517 (50.2%)

Size

8997

3828.20

795.92

logSize

8997

6.76892

6.6795

BtoM

8997

0.56547

0.5655

95

3567 (39.65%)

zero Frequency

0
913 (10.15%)

Table 3. Continued.
Panel E. MFTS: Means of CAR, MQFE, FE, Size, logSize, and BtoM over Time
N

ACART

AMQFET

AFET

AsizeT

AlogSizeT

ABtoMT

1990

381

-0.00016

-0.00234***

-0.00208***

2924.38

6.8192

0.6995

1991

507

-0.00138

-0.00234***

-0.00117***

2569.44

6.7475

0.6570

1992

685

0.00791*** -0.00291***

-0.00069***

2588.51

6.5850

0.6139

1993

663

0.00318*

-0.00315***

-0.00105***

2788.11

6.5293

0.5567

1994

760

0.00304*

-0.00263***

-0.00062***

2388.75

6.5802

0.5343

1995

890

0.00298*

-0.00247***

-0.00080***

3992.58

6.7335

0.5273

1996

944

0.00459*** -0.00195***

-0.00070***

4274.88

6.8463

0.5135

1997

964

0.00278*

-0.00148***

-0.00012

3606.87

6.8125

0.4910

1998

969

0.00333**

-0.00081***

-0.00075***

4597.63

6.9342

0.5161

1999

954

0.00699*** -0.00085***

-0.00028

4559.57

6.8049

0.5850

2000

886

0.00196

-0.00074***

-0.00018

5223.82

6.8960

0.6349

2001

392

0.00282

-0.00069***

-0.00068*

5327.04

6.8483

0.6192

Panel F. MFTS: Descriptive Statistics of CAR, MQFE, FE, # of Analysts, STD, Size, logSize, and
BtoM across Portfolios
N

ACARP

AMQFEP

AFEP

median FE

%(+FE)

%(−FE)

P1

2965

0.00381***

-0.00573***

-0.00207***

-0.00015

0.45

0.55

P2

891

0.00398**

-0.00161***

-0.00054**

0.00000

0.51

0.49

P3

1510

0.00448***

-0.00034***

-0.00025**

0.00000

0.55

0.45

P4

996

0.00184

0.00033***

0.00013

0.00014

0.61

0.39

P5

2635

0.00306***

0.00094***

0.00035***

0.00033

0.69

0.31

N

# Analysts

AsizeP

AlogSizeP

ABtoMP

STD

P1

2965

4.34

1356.08

5.8541

0.6933

0.334

P2

891

5.70

2151.47

6.2760

0.6049

0.204

P3

1510

7.80

4690.14

7.1434

0.4709

0.096

P4

996

8.48

4456.69

7.4315

0.4959

0.105

P5

2635

9.28

6445.39

7.4999

0.4888

0.130
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Table 4. Validity Test for MFFE and MFTS: Binomial Test
This table summarizes a binomial test of the null hypothesis that the probability ( p ) of getting
positive forecast errors [(+) FEs] is 0.5 for all n trials – i.e., Ho: p = 1 / 2 . Note that “n” is the
total number of positive and negative FEs excluding zero FEs. Following Conover (1980; pp. 9699), I calculate the test statistic (T) and the corresponding critical regions at the 5% and 1% levels
as follows:
T = the number of (+) FEs;
t1_5% (lower limit at the 5% level) = np − 1.96 np (1 − p ) ;
t2_5% (upper limit at the 5% level) = np + 1.96 np (1 − p ) ;
t1_1% (lower limit at the 1% level) = np − 2.58 np (1 − p ) ;
t2_1% (upper limit at the 1% level) = np + 2.58 np (1 − p ) .
Panel A. MFFE
N # (+)FE # (−)FE

n

% (+)FE % (−)FE

T

t1_1% t2_1% t1_5% t2_5%

P1*** 8512

3634

4134

7768

47

53

3634

3770

3998

3798

3970

P2*** 4482

2108

1912

4020

52

48

2108

1928

2092

1948

2072

P3*** 6441

3013

2549

5562

54

46

3013

2685

2877

2708

2854

P4*** 5340

2831

1860

4691

60

40

2831

2257

2434

2278

2413

P5*** 9830

5599

2718

8317

67

33

5599

4041

4276

4069

4248

Total 34605
Panel B. MFTS
Na # (+)FE # (−)FE

Na

% (+)FE % (−)FE

T

t1_1% t2_1% t1_5% t2_5%

P1*** 2965

1209

1505

2714

45

55

1209

1290

1424

1306

1408

P2

891

409

397

806

51

49

409

366

440

375

431

P3**

1510

724

584

1308

55

45

724

607

701

619

689

P4***

996

549

344

893

61

39

549

408

485

417

476

P5*** 2635

1626

737

2363

69

31

1626

1119

1244

1134

1229

Total 8997
a
N includes the number of zero FEs, while n does not.
*** significant at the 1% level.
** significant at the 5% level.
* significant at the 10% level.
Note 1: N is the total number of observations in each portfolio; #(+)FE is the number of positive forecast
errors; #(−)FE is the number of negative forecast errors; n is the number of #(+)FE plus #(−)FE. Other
terms are as defined above.
Note 2: P1 denotes the most optimistic portfolio; P2 denotes another optimistic portfolio – i.e., less
optimistic than P1 and more optimistic than P3; P3 denotes the least optimistic portfolio – i.e., less
optimistic than both P1 and P2; P4 denotes a less pessimistic portfolio than P5; P5 denotes the most
pessimistic portfolio.
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Table 5. Persistent Bias in Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts: Autocorrelation Test
Panel A shows a nonparametric Chi-square test to test the null hypothesis that getting (+) FE at
the contemporaneous quarter is equally likely as getting (−) FE. Each subset contains the number
of FE sign transitions (including no sign transitions) that firms make from quarter t-1 to the
contemporaneous quarter t. There are four subsets in this case because I compare
contemporaneous FE (FEt) with FE one quarter prior to the contemporaneous one (FEt-1). The
test statistic (Chi-square; χ 2 ) and theoretical frequencies are calculated as follows:61

(O d − Td ) 2
with df = (r − 1)(c − 1)
χ =∑
Td
d =1
2

4

where

Od
Td
df
r
c

= the observed frequency of FE sign transitions for subset d where d = 1,…,4;
= the theoretical frequency of FE sign transitions for subset d under the null
hypothesis;
= degree of freedom for the χ2 test;
= the number of rows in the contingency table (2 in this case); and
= the number of columns in the contingency table (2 in this case).

Panel B summarizes the results from a parametric test of autocorrelation between FEt and FEt-1.
The following are the specification of the first-order autoregressive [AR(1)] models used to test
the autocorrelation structure of FEs:

SFE t = λ 0 + λ1 SFE t −1 + ϖ t
SFEt = λ0′ + λ1′SFEt −1 + λ2′SFEt −1 D 2 + λ3′SFEt −1 D3 + λ4′SFEt −1 D 4 + λ5′SFEt −1 D5 + ϖ t′
where

SFE t = the analysts’ forecast errors ( FE t ) standardized by the stock price 10 days
prior to the earnings announcement at t;
SFE t −1 = the lagged analysts’ forecast errors ( FE t −1 ) standardized by the stock price 10
days prior to the earnings announcement at t-1;
= a dummy variable that equals one if an observation belongs to P2 and zero
D2
otherwise;
= a dummy variable that equals one if an observation belongs to P3 and zero
D3
otherwise;
= a dummy variable that equals one if an observation belongs to P4 and zero
D4
otherwise;
= a dummy variable that equals one if an observation belongs to P5 and zero
D5
otherwise; and
ϖ t ,ϖ t′ = independently and identically distributed random error terms.
Again firm subscripts are omitted.
61

Refer to Gujarati (1988; pp. 373-375). The theoretical frequency is computed by multiplying the
marginal frequency of the contemporaneous forecast errors (i.e., # of (+) or (-) FE at t) by the ratio of the
marginal frequency of the lagged forecast errors (i.e., # of (+) or (-) FE at t-1) over the total frequency
(=27255). For example, the theoretical frequency of 8702 is calculated as follows: 15246 × (15557 ÷
27255).
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Table 5. Continued.
Panel A. Non-Parametric Chi-square Test: MFFE
Observed
# of (+) FE at t

Theoretical
# of (+) FE at t

10627

# of (−) FE at t
4930

Total

# of (+) FE at t-1

15557

8702

# of (−) FE at t
6855

# of (−) FE at t-1

4619

7079

11698

6544

5154

15246

12009

27255

15246

12009

χ 2 = 2251
df = 1
2
χ (1) = 3.83 (5%) or 6.63 (1%)
Panel B. Non-Parametric Chi-square Test: MFTS
Observed
# of (+) FE at t

Theoretical
Total

# of (+) FE at t

4177

2297

# of (−) FE at t
1880

# of (+) FE at t-1

2846

# of (−) FE at t
1331

# of (−) FE at t-1

1228

2005

3233

1777

1456

4074

3336

7410

4074

3336

χ 2 = 669
df = 1
χ 2 (1) = 3.83 (5%) or 6.63 (1%)
Panel C. Parametric Test: First-Order Autoregressive Model [AR(1)] without Portfolio Dummies

SFE t = λ 0 + λ1 SFE t −1 + ϖ t

Coefficient

Mean-Frequency Forecast Error
(MFFE) Method
Pr > |t|
Estimate

Mean-Frequency Time-Series
(MFTS) Method
Estimate
Pr > |t|

λ0

-0.00041

<.0001

-0.00054

<.0001

λ1

0.08370

<.0001

0.09390

<.0001

R-square

0.0229

0.0249
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Table 5. Continued.
Panel D. Parametric Test: AR(1) with Portfolio Dummies

SFE t = λ 0′ + λ1′SFE t −1 + λ 2′ SFE t −1 D 2 + λ 3′ SFE t −1 D3 + λ 4′ SFE t −1 D 4 + λ 5′ SFE t −1 D5 + ϖ t
Coefficient

Mean-Frequency Forecast Error
(MFFE) Method
Pr > |t|
Estimate

Mean-Frequency Time-Series
(MFTS) Method
Estimate
Pr > |t|

λ 0′
λ1′
λ 2′
λ 3′

-0.00046

<.0001

-0.00056

<.0001

0.0740

<.0001

0.0933

<.0001

-0.0492

<.0001

-0.0683

0.0024

0.1298

<.0001

0.1450

0.0028

λ 4′
λ 5′

0.1100

<.0001

0.1059

0.0900

0.1708

<.0001

0.0303

0.1705

0.0740

<.0001

0.0933

<.0001

0.0248

0.0022

0.0250

0.2438

0.2038

<.0001

0.2383

<.0001

(P4)

0.1840

<.0001

0.1992

0.0013

(P5)

0.2448

<.0001

0.1236

<.0001

Pair-wise Comparison

F-value

Pr > |F|

F-value

Pr > |F|

λ1′ = λ1′ + λ 2′
λ1′ = λ1′ + λ 3′
λ1′ = λ1′ + λ 4′
λ1′ = λ1′ + λ 5′

31.59

<.0001

9.19

0.0024

39.78

<.0001

8.94

0.0028

56.87

<.0001

2.87

0.0900

155.63

<.0001

1.88

0.1705

67.06

<.0001

16.46

<.0001

94.99

<.0001

7.04

0.0080

200.48

<.0001

10.79

0.0010

λ1′ + λ 3′ = λ1′ + λ 4′
λ1′ + λ 3′ = λ1′ + λ 5′

0.64

0.4232

0.25

0.6177

2.85

0.0913

4.79

0.0287

λ1′ + λ 4′ = λ1′ + λ 5′

9.86

0.0017

1.33

0.2480

R-square

0.0311

Marginal Effect

λ1′ (P1)
λ1′ + λ 2′ (P2)
λ1′ + λ 3′ (P3)
λ1′ + λ 4′
λ1′ + λ 5′

λ1′ + λ 2′ = λ1′ + λ 3′
λ1′ + λ 2′ = λ1′ + λ 4′
λ1′ + λ 2′ = λ1′ + λ 5′

0.0275
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Table 6. Persistence Bias in Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts: Herfindahl Index
This table shows portfolio-time frequencies, industry frequencies, stock exchange frequencies, and
corresponding Herfindahl indexes – Time Herfindahl, Industry Herfindahl, and Stock Exchange
Herfindahl. The portfolio-time frequencies are firm-quarters in each portfolio over time (12-year
period), while the industry frequencies reflect firm-quarters in each portfolio across industry
sectors. Herfindahl indexes in Panels A and B measure the relative concentration of a portfolio
over the 12-year period and are calculated as follows:
12

FREQt , P

t =1

FREQsum, P

HP = ∑
where

HP
FREQt , P

= the Herfindahl index for portfolio P where P = P1, …, P5;

FREQ sum, P

= the aggregate frequency of portfolio P over the 10-year period.

= the marginal frequency of portfolio P in year t; and

Portfolios, which are observed in a specific year, will have a Herfindahl index of “1”. Portfolios,
which are spread evenly over time, will have a Herfindahl index of "0.0833”. Herfindahl indexes
in Panels C and D (E and F) indicate the relative concentration of an industry sector (an
exchange) across portfolios and are computed as follows:
5

FREQ p , IND

p =1

FREQ sum, IND

5

FREQ p , EX

p =1

FREQ sum , EX

H IND = ∑
H EX = ∑
where

H IND
H EX

= the Herfindahl index for industry sector IND where IND = 1, …, 11;

FREQ p , IND

= the Herfindahl index for an exchange EX where EX = NYSE,
AMEX, NASDAQ;
= the marginal frequency of an industry IND for a portfolio p;

FREQ p , EX

= the marginal frequency of an exchange EX for a portfolio p;

FREQ sum, IND

= the aggregate frequency of an industry IND across portfolios; and

FREQ sum, EX

= the aggregate frequency of an exchange EX across portfolios.

If an industry sector (or an exchange) clusters in a specific portfolio, it will have a Herfindahl
index of “1”. If an industry sector (or an exchange) is evenly spread across portfolios, it will have
a Herfindahl index of "0.2”.
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Table 6. Continued.
Panel A. Time Herfindahl Index: MFFE
Portfolio Frequency over Time

Herfindahl Index for Each Portfolio across Years

Year

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

1990

551

267

392

250

226

0.0043

0.0036

0.0038

0.0022

0.0005

1991

672

308

446

360

271

0.0063

0.0048

0.0049

0.0046

0.0008

1992

808

420

520

387

345

0.0092

0.0089

0.0067

0.0053

0.0012

1993

963

403

545

386

405

0.0130

0.0082

0.0073

0.0053

0.0017

1994

1079

451

630

451

473

0.0164

0.0103

0.0098

0.0073

0.0023

1995

968

450

610

547

624

0.0132

0.0103

0.0092

0.0107

0.0041

1996

848

415

670

603

890

0.0101

0.0087

0.0111

0.0130

0.0083

1997

800

381

598

624

1186

0.0090

0.0074

0.0088

0.0139

0.0147

1998

632

409

566

586

1457

0.0056

0.0085

0.0079

0.0122

0.0221

1999

548

418

605

530

1605

0.0042

0.0089

0.0090

0.0100

0.0269

2000

430

395

549

418

1597

0.0026

0.0079

0.0074

0.0062

0.0266

2001
Total/

139

123

242

153

714

0.0003

0.0008

0.0014

0.0008

0.0053

8438

4440

6373

5295

9793

0.0941

0.0883

0.0872

0.0916

0.1145

HP

Panel B. Time Herfindahl Index: MFTS
Portfolio Frequency over Time

Herfindahl Index for Each Portfolio across Years

Year

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

1990

155

50

87

44

45

0.0027

0.0031

0.0033

0.0020

0.0003

1991

203

70

88

78

68

0.0047

0.0062

0.0034

0.0061

0.0007

1992

277

98

137

81

92

0.0087

0.0121

0.0082

0.0066

0.0012

1993

323

78

115

58

89

0.0119

0.0077

0.0058

0.0034

0.0011

1994

349

77

144

74

116

0.0139

0.0075

0.0091

0.0055

0.0019

1995

364

89

155

118

164

0.0151

0.0100

0.0106

0.0140

0.0039

1996

335

75

174

117

243

0.0128

0.0071

0.0133

0.0138

0.0085

1997

293

72

163

102

334

0.0098

0.0065

0.0117

0.0105

0.0161

1998

233

99

153

101

383

0.0062

0.0123

0.0103

0.0103

0.0211

1999

220

68

138

101

427

0.0055

0.0058

0.0084

0.0103

0.0263

2000

153

85

110

84

454

0.0027

0.0091

0.0053

0.0071

0.0297

2001
Total/

59

30

45

38

220

0.0004

0.0011

0.0009

0.0015

0.0070

2964

891

1509

996

2635

0.0943

0.0885

0.0902

0.0911

0.1177

HP

Note: P1 denotes the most optimistic portfolio; P2 denotes another optimistic portfolio – i.e., less optimistic
than P1 and more optimistic than P3; P3 denotes the least optimistic portfolio – i.e., less optimistic than both
P1 and P2; P4 denotes a less pessimistic portfolio than P5; P5 denotes the most pessimistic portfolio.
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Table 6. Continued.
Panel C. Industry Herfindahl Index: MFFE
Industry Frequency
Aggregate

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

H IND

1

a

4017

622

461

726

667

1541

0.245

2

b

2514

498

249

555

377

835

0.231

c

3018

705

374

588

470

881

0.217

4d

4452

971

611

1046

673

1151

0.211

e

2035

557

228

340

303

607

0.227

f

1787

541

240

238

293

475

0.225

g

1011

344

178

173

121

195

0.228

h

5829

1635

775

1082

806

1531

0.219

i

Industry*

3
5

6
7
8

9

4399

1167

601

719

770

1142

0.214

j

4105

1111

542

691

552

1209

0.224

k

1429

361

220

283

305

260

0.205

10
11

Panel D. Industry Herfindahl Index: MFTS
Industry Frequency
Aggregate

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

H IND

1

a

921

186

116

232

104

283

0.227

2

b

581

189

40

151

41

160

0.259

c

753

306

82

121

104

140

0.256

d

1042

345

131

272

120

174

0.235

e

529

214

45

59

66

145

0.274

f

629

194

47

56

59

273

0.306

g

276

110

30

47

17

72

0.272

h

1511

564

139

225

155

428

0.261

i

1304

365

104

121

160

554

0.289

1087

407

103

141

94

342

0.272

Industry*

3
4

5

6
7
8

9

10

j

k

362
85
54
85
74
64
11
0.206
* The following superscripts indicate I/B/E/S industry sectors: a Finance; b Health Care; c Consumer NonDurables; d Consumer Services; e Consumer Durables; f Energy; g Transportation; h Technology; i Basic
Industries; j Capital Goods; k Public Utilities.
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Table 6. Continued.
Panel E. Stock Exchange Herfindahl Index: MFFE
Industry Frequency
Industry

Aggregate

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

H EX

NYSE

24215

5549

3049

4482

3984

7151

0.217

AMEX

678

329

91

106

70

82

0.303

NASDAQ

9712

2634

1342

1853

1286

2597

0.218

Panel F. Stock Exchange Herfindahl Index: MFTS
Industry Frequency
Industry

Aggregate

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

H EX

NYSE

6287

1868

580

1032

810

1997

0.241

AMEX

228

155

21

28

8

16

0.492

NASDAQ

2482

942

290

450

178

622

0.259
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Table 7. Multiple Regression Models
This table reports the relationships between analysts’ earnings forecasts and investors’ earnings
expectations and between the predicted CARs under the NEH and the REH, and the regression
results from the following models:

CARt = α1 P1 + α 2 P2 + α 3 P3 + α 4 P4 + α 5 P5 + β1diffSizet + β 2 diffBtoM t + ut
FEt
CARt = a1 P1 + a2 P2 + a3 P3 + a4 P4 + a5 P5 + b1
+ b2 diffSizet + b3 diffBtoM t + υt
STDt
FEt
FEt
FEt
P2 + b3′
P3
CARt = a1′ + a2′ P2 + a3′ P3 + a4′ P4 + a5′ P5 + b1′
+ b2′
STD
STD
STD
FEt
FEt
P4 + b5′
P5 + b6′ diffSizet + b7′ diffBtoM t + ωt
+b4′
STDt
STDt
where

CARt
Pp

FEt
Ai
Ft
STDt

= the 3-day [−2: 0] abnormal stock returns for a quarterly earnings
announcement
= a dummy variables that equal one if an observation belongs to
portfolio p and zero otherwise, p = 1, …, 5;
= analysts’ earnings forecast errors at quarter t;
= the actual quarterly earnings at quarter t;
= the most recent analysts’ consensus forecasts for Ai ;
= the standard deviation of analysts' consensus forecasts at quarter t;

Pt

= Pt × Shrt;
= the closing stock price at the third month of quarter t;

Shrt

= the number of common shares used to calculate EPS at quarter t;

diffSizet

= the difference between log( MVEt ) and the grand mean of

MVEt

log( MVEt ) where log( MVEt ) = the logarithm of MVEt;

BVE t
where BVE t = common equity (total) at quarter t;
MVE t
diffBtoM t = the difference between BtoM t and the grand mean of BtoM t ; and
u t , υt , ωt = identically and independently distributed random error terms.
Note that Pt , Shrt , and BVE t are extracted from COMPUSTAT.
BtoM t

=
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Table 7. Continued.
Panel A.
Regression of CAR on Portfolio Dummies, diffSize, and diffBtoM without Interaction Terms
CARt = α1 P1 + α 2 P2 + α 3 P3 + α 4 P4 + α 5 P5 + β1diffSizet + β 2 diffBtoM t + ut

Coefficient

α1
α2
α3

Mean-Frequency Forecast Error
(MFFE) Method
Pr > |t|
Estimate

Mean-Frequency Time-Series
(MFTS) Method
Estimate
Pr > |t|

0.00264

<.0001

0.00231

0.0400

0.00349

<.0001

0.00212

0.2880

0.00417

<.0001

0.00450

0.0027

α4
α5

0.00362

<.0001

0.00226

0.1926

0.00296

<.0001

0.00340

0.0016

b1

-0.00084

0.0001

-0.00133

0.0021

b2

0.00515

<.0001

0.00515

0.0153

Pair-wise Comparison

F-Value

Pr > |F|

F-Value

Pr > |F|

α1 = α 2
α1 = α 3

0.67

0.4145

0.01

0.9336

2.59

0.1078

1.33

0.2491

α1 = α 4
α1 = α 5

0.95

0.3309

0.00

0.9821

0.14

0.7111

0.46

0.4967

α 2 =α3

0.39

0.5323

0.90

0.3420

α 2 =α 4
α 2 =α5

0.01

0.9049

0.00

0.9572

0.27

0.6057

0.32

0.5740

α3 =α 4

0.28

0.5979

0.97

0.3256

α3 =α5

1.83

0.1765

0.36

0.5466

α 4 =α5

0.49

0.4821

0.33

0.5676

F-value

23.43

6.78

Pr > F

<.0001

<.0001

R-square

0.0061

0.0068

Adj R-sq

0.0059

0.0058
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Table 7. Continued.
Panel B.
Regression of CAR on Portfolio Dummies, FE, diffSize, and diffBtoM without Interaction Terms

CARt = a1 P1 + a2 P2 + a3 P3 + a4 P4 + a5 P5 + b1

Coefficient

FEt
+ b2 diffSizet + b3 diffBtoM t + υt
STDt

Mean-Frequency Forecast Error
(MFFE) Method
Pr > |t|
Estimate

Mean-Frequency Time-Series
(MFTS) Method
Estimate
Pr > |t|

a1

0.00359

<.0001

0.00427

0.0001

a2

0.00368

<.0001

0.00275

0.1628

a3

0.00424

<.0001

0.00426

0.0040

a4

0.00293

0.0001

0.00148

0.3868

a5

0.00178

0.0018

0.00214

0.0453

b1

0.00208

<.0001

0.00183

<.0001

b2

-0.00088

<.0001

-0.00125

0.0035

b3

0.00623

<.0001

0.00540

0.0100

Pair-wise Comparison

F-Value

Pr > |F|

F-Value

Pr > |F|

a1 = a 2

0.01

0.9307

0.46

0.4992

a1 = a 3

0.49

0.4860

0.00

0.9967

a1 = a 4

0.43

0.5119

1.78

0.1818

a1 = a 5

4.28

0.0385

1.76

0.1848

a 2 = a3

0.28

0.5993

0.37

0.5413

a2 = a4

0.44

0.5069

0.23

0.6294

a 2 = a5

3.53

0.0602

0.07

0.7862

a3 = a 4

1.65

0.1984

1.53

0.2167

a3 = a5

7.75

0.0054

1.39

0.2380

a 4 = a5

1.51

0.2187

0.11

0.7399

F-value

108.02

27.99

Pr > F

<.0001

<.0001

R-square

0.0277

0.0275

Adj R-sq

0.0275

0.0265
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Table 7. Continued.
Panel C.
Regression of CAR on Portfolio Dummies, FE, diffSize, diffBtoM with Interaction Terms

CARt = a1′ + a2′ P2 + a3′ P3 + a4′ P4 + a5′ P5 + b1′
+b4′

FEt
FEt
FEt
P2 + b3′
P3
+ b2′
STD
STD
STD

FEt
FEt
P4 + b5′
P5 + b6′ diffSizet + b7′ diffBtoM t + ωt
STDt
STDt

Panel C-1. Parameter Estimation
Mean-Frequency Forecast Error
(MFFE) Method
Pr > |t|
Coefficient
Estimate

Mean-Frequency Time-Series
(MFTS) Method
Estimate
Pr > |t|

a1′
a2′

0.00359

<.0001

0.00406

0.0004

0.00012

0.9045

-0.00112

0.6209

a3′

0.00066

0.4832

0.00005

0.9794

a4′
a5′

-0.00056

0.5792

-0.00252

0.2286

-0.00160

0.0671

-0.00175

0.2799

b1′
b2′

0.00210

<.0001

0.00165

<.0001

0.00031

0.2349

0.00075

0.1694

b3′

0.00063

0.0235

0.00156

0.0062

b4′
b5′

-0.00025

0.3378

0.00013

0.7826

-0.00031

0.1234

-0.00003

0.9186

b6′

-0.00089

<.0001

-0.00129

0.0025

b7′

0.00629

<.0001

0.00538

0.0104

F-value

70.20

18.71

Pr > F

<.0001

<.0001

R-square

0.0283

0.0288

Adj R-sq

0.0279

0.0273
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Table 7. Continued.
Panel C-2. Fixed and Marginal Effects
MFFE

MFTS

Fixed Effects

Estimate

Pr > |F|

Estimate

Pr > |F|

a1′

0.00359

<.0001

0.00406

0.0004

a1′ + a2′
a1′ + a3′

0.00371

<.0001

0.00294

0.1371

0.00425

<.0001

0.00411

0.0056

a1′ + a4′
a1′ + a5′

0.00303

<.0001

0.00154

0.3731

0.00199

0.0006

0.00231

0.0315

Marginal Effects

Estimate

Pr > |F|

Estimate

Pr > |F|

b1′

0.00210

<.0001

0.00165

<.0001

b1′ + b2′
b1′ + b3′

0.00241

<.0001

0.00240

<.0001

0.00273

<.0001

0.00321

<.0001

b1′ + b4′
b1′ + b5′

0.00185

<.0001

0.00178

<.0001

0.00179

<.0001

0.00167

<.0001
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